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THE PRICE OF TRUST:
AN EXAMINATION OF FIDUCIARY DUTY
AND THE LENDER-BORROWER RELATIONSHIP
Cecil J. Hunt, I1*

Comparing the search for elements which will give rise to a fiduciary

relationship between a bank and a borrower to the quest for the elusive holy grail, Professor Hunt proposes that, rather than existing
only in special circumstances, the fiduciary relationship is a normal
aspect of the bank-borrowerrelationship.Hunt explains that a fiduciary obligation is part of the parties' assumptive base in the bank-borrower relationship that must by necessity exist before any borrower
would entrust private or business information to a bank in return for
a loan. While acknowledging that such a relationshipmight be inapposite in the initial bargainingprocess of the relation, since the parties are adverse at this time, ProfessorHunt demonstrates that there
is no such impediment existing when the parties move into the next
phase of their relationship - the servicing and processing of the
agreement.ProfessorHunt further argues that recognition of a fiduciary relationshipat this phase of the bank-borrower relationshipwould
be beneficial not only to the parties involved, but to society as a whole
by providing more protection to borrowers, and thus encouraging more
participationfrom the public in the banking industry at a minimum
of cost and disruption to the traditional relationship between the
parties.
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INTRODUCTION

The booming field of lender liability has virtually revolutionized the
conventional relationship between borrowers and lenders.1 In contrast to
their traditionally passive role in the debtor-creditor relationship, 2 borrowers have recently become uncharacteristically aggressive and adversarial, bringing suit against their lenders with increasing frequency.3
1. Daniel R. Fischel, The Economics of Lender Liability, 99 YALE L.J. 131, 131-33
(1989). Professor Fischel points out that
[i]n an increasing number of other well-publicized trials, juries-and occasionally courts in non-jury trials-have awarded borrowers staggering amounts in
lender liability suits against banks. While some of these verdicts have been reversed on appeal, the basis for reversal in these cases has been limited to the
facts of each case. The area of lender liability remains a booming area of intense
concern to lenders and students of commercial law.
Id. at 133.
2. 5A MICHIE ON BANKS AND BANKING I (1994).
3. See generally Werner F. Ebke & James R. Griffin, Lender Liability to Debtors:
Toward a Conceptual Framework, 40 Sw. L.J. 775 (1986) (examining the possibility of a
balance between the interests of lenders and debtors by focusing on the impact of common
law theories on lender liability resulting from alleged misconduct); Lawrence F. Flick, II &
Dennis Replansky, Liability of Banks to Their Borrowers: Pitfalls and Protections, 103
BANKING L.J. 220 (1986) (describing the theories of lender liability, state and federal liability
statutes, and lender protection from liability); Loeb H. Granoff, Emerging Theories of
Lender Liability: Flawed Applications of Old Concepts, 104 BANKING L.J. 492 (1987) (arguing that lender liability is nothing more than misapplication of tort and contracts law);
Debra Cassens Moss, Borrowers Fight Back with Lender Liability, A.BA J., Mar. 1987, at
65 (examining judgments holding lenders liable for unfair treatment of borrowers); PRACTIC-
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degree of success in the
Many such borrowers have enjoyed a considerable
4
courts, often with quite spectacular results.

In achieving these results, borrowers have not relied on a single theory of liability,5 but rather they have employed a wide range of theories,
including federal statutes' and the creative use of such traditional com(1987) (examining
recent developments in lender liability litigation through several different articles); John 0.
Tyler, Jr., Emerging Theories of Lender Liability in Texas, 24 Hous. L. REV. 411 (1987)
(suggesting that traditional contract and tort law are appropriate means for addressing the
failure of lenders to exercise good faith in dealings with borrowers); John J. Walsh, Common
ING LAW INSTITUTE, LENDER LIABmITY LITIGATION: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

Law Claims Against Lenders, in LENDER

LIABILITY LITIGATION: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

at 9,

14-40 (PLI 1988) (discussing lender liability and common law claims such as misrepresentation, economic duress, tortious interference, negligence, breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, excessive control, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and general tort
liability); James R. Borders, Note, The Growth of Lender Liability: An Economic Perspective, 21 GA. L. REV. 723 (1987) (examining three cases that show lenders' contractual obligations to borrowers who default and must return the principal); Mark Snyderman, Comment,
What's So Good About Good Faith? The Good Faith Performance Obligation in Commercial Lending, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1335 (1988) (discussing the concept of good faith performance in commercial lending); James Mabry Vickery, Note, A Special Relationship: The Use
of the Duty of Good Faith and Fair Dealing to Impose Tort Damages in Contracts Between Lender and Borrower, 9 REV. LITIG. 93 (1990) (examining the elements of a cause of
action in tort between a lender and borrower and situations in which courts have found that
the lender violated the duty of good faith and arguing against the application of the duty of
good faith to commercial lending); Sarah Barlett, Borrower v. Banker: The Newest Lawsuit
in Town, Bus. WK., July 14, 1986, at 59 (examining the lender liability phenomenon).
4. See Fischel, supra note 1 (describing the awards to borrowers as "staggering"). See,
e.g., K.M.C. Co. v. Irving Trust Co., 757 F.2d 752 (6th Cir. 1985) (affirming a $75 million
dollar jury verdict in favor of the borrower); Penthouse Int'l v. Dominion Fed. Sav. & Loan
Ass'n, 665 F. Supp. 301 (S.D.N.Y. 1987), (awarding $130 million) modified by 885 F.2d 963
(2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1005 (1989); State Nat'l Bank v. Farah Mfg. Co., 678
S.W.2d 661 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984) (affirming a jury verdict of over $18.5 million dollars).
5. See Paul M. Jones, Comment, Good Faith Theories of Lender Liability, 48 LA. L.
REV. 1181 (1988) (pointing out that while all of the cases brought by borrowers under these
various claims of action "loosely coalesce under the term 'lender liability'. . . that term denotes more than a collective reference to theories of law; it describes a marked tendency of
courts to apply well-established theories of law to the lender-borrower relationship for the
first time"). See also Ebke, supra note 3, at 813 (examining the need for a conceptual reorientation of lender liability); MELRYN L. CANTOR ET AL., Lender Liability Theories, in
LENDER LIABILITY LITIGATION: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

71, 74 (PLI Com. L. & Practice Course

Handbook Series No. A4-4200, 1987) (explaining that borrowers use traditional theories of
liability to prove lender liability); Fischel, supra note 1, at 133 (arguing that "[1]ender liability cases have led to the creation of an area of commercial law that has not been accompanied by the development of a coherent theoretical framework establishing the rights of
lenders and their duties to their borrowers") (footnote omitted).
6. See Sanford M. Litvak & Eric J. Lobenfeld, Lender Liability Litigation, Recent
Developments: Claims under Federal Law, RICO, Antitrust and Bank Holding Company

Act, in LENDER

LIABILITY LITIGATION: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

247, 249 (PLI Com. L. & Prac-

tice Course Handbook Series No. 386 (1987)). See also Roark M. Reed & Terrance G. Reed,
Lender Liability Under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, in
LENDER LIABILITY LAW AND LITIGATION

(MB) ch. 9 (1994) (discussing the use of RICO's civil

cause of action); United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d 1550 (11th Cir. 1990) (holding that the creditor of the corporation may be liable under CERCLA), cert. denied, 498
U.S. 1046 (1991); Schlifke v. Seafirst Corp., 866 F.2d 935 (7th Cir. 1989) (applying federal
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mon law claims as negligence,7 fraud, and negligent misrepresentation,"
breach of contract,9 duress, 0 interference with contractual relations, 1 excessive control," waiver,"' breach of the obligation of good faith, 14 and
breach of fiduciary duty.' 5 To date, the claim that lenders owe a duty to

act in good faith and are liable for its breach has received the majority of

attention and acceptance by both scholars 6 and judges.17 Conversely, the
securities laws in making a judgment); Morosani v. First Nat'l Bank of Atlanta, 703 F.2d
1220 (11th Cir. 1983) (holding that the act of a bank improperly charging excessive interest
clearly fell within the requirements of a violation of RICO); United States v. Nicolet, 712 F.
Supp. 1193 (E.D. Pa. 1989) (holding that the holder of a mortgate could be liable for response costs under CERCLA); National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Eaton, 701 F. Supp. 1031
(S.D.N.Y. 1988) (dismissing a counterclaim alleging the insurance company aided and abetted the limited partnership's federal securities law violations); In re Rubin Bros. Footwear,
Inc., 73 B.R. 346 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1987) (holding that plaintiffs' claim against lender was
valid under RICO); Odesser v. Continental Bank, 676 F. Supp. 1305 (E.D. Pa. 1987) (holding that manipulation of cash flow, fraudulent loan agreements, and other financial maneuvers constituted a cause of action under RICO); LSC Assoc. v. Lomas & Nettleton Fin.
Corp., 629 F. Supp. 979 (E.D. Pa. 1986) (holding that a claim against a lender under RICO
was valid).
7. See Bevier v. Production Credit Ass'n, 429 N.W.2d 287 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988). See
also Connor v. Great Western Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 447 P.2d 609 (Cal. 1968) (holding that
bank had a duty to exercise care to prevent the construction and sale of defective houses
and was liable for damages); Small v. South Norwalk Sav. Bank, 535 A.2d 1292 (Conn. 1988)
(accepting theory that the bank owed a duty to the mortgagee and the breach of that duty
amounted to negligence); Jacques v. First Nat'l Bank, 515 A.2d 756 (Md. 1986) (holding that
bank owed customer a duty of reasonable care in processing and deciding on a loan
application).
8. See Central States Stamping Co. v. Terminal Equip. Co., 727 F.2d 1405 (6th Cir
1984); Barrett v. Bank of Am., 229 Cal. Rptr. 16 (Ct. App. 1986) (holding that a constructive
fraud against the bank was valid); Richfield Bank & Trust Co. v. Sjogren, 244 N.W.2d 648
(Minn. 1976).
9. See Penthouse Int'l v. Dominion Fed. Sav. & Loan, 855 F.2d 963 (2d Cir. 1988). See
also Landes Const. Co., v. Royal Bank, 833 F.2d 1365 (9th Cir. 1987) (finding that the bank
breached an oral agreement to company); Kruse v. Bank of Am., 248 Cal. Rptr. 217 (Ct.
App. 1988) (deciding breach of contract issue asserted by growers against bank).
10. See Pecos Constr. Co. v. Mortgage Investors Co., 459 P.2d 842 (N.M. 1969).
11. See State Nat'l Bank v. Farah Mfg. Co., 678 S.W.2d 661 (Tex Ct. App. 1984); See
also Melamed v. Lake County Nat'l Bank, 727 F.2d 1399 (6th Cir. 1984) (deciding claims of
tortious interference of business relationships by bank).
12. See State Nat'l Bank, 678 S.W.2d at 661.
13. See Nevada Nat'l Bank v. Huff, 582 P.2d 364 (Nev. 1978).
14. For a list of sources addressing a breach of the obligation of good faith, see infra
notes 16 and 17.
15. For a list of sources addressing a breach of fiduciary duty, see infra notes 16 and
17.
16. William Warren, Good Faith and Fair Dealing Under the Uniform Commercial
Code, in EMERGING THEORIES OF LENDER LiABmITY 59 (H. Chaitman ed. 1985).

See

also

K.M.C. Co. v. Irving Trust Co., 757 F.2d 752 (6th Cir. 1985) (holding that lender may have
an implied obligation of good faith to borrower); Kruse v. Bank of Am., 248 Cal. Rptr. 217
(Ct. App. 1988) (holding that debtors failed to establish cause of action for breach of good
faith obligation of contract), cert. denied 488 U.S. 1043 (1989); State Nat'l Bank v. Farah
Mfg. Co., 678 S.W.2d 661 (Tex Ct. App. 1984) (holding that creditor had committed fraud
and interferred with debtor's business); Alan A. Blakeboro & Rex Heeseman, Good Faith
Duties and Tort Remedies in Lender Liability Litigation, 15 W. ST. U.L. REv. 617 (1988)
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least accepted and most severely criticized theory of lender liability has

been that lenders owe fiduciary duty to their borrowers and are liable for
its breach.'" This article will examine this much maligned and little understood area of lender liability-liability based on the existence and
breach of a fiduciary duty.
A careful review of the case law in this area reveals that where bor-

(examining tort remedies for bad faith breach of contract in commercial cases and application in lender liability litigation); John 0. Tyler, Jr., Emerging Theories of Lender Liability
in Texas, 24 Hous. L. REV. 411 (1987) (examining good faith doctrine and lender liability);
Jonathan K. Van Patten, Lender Liability: Changing or Enforcing the Ground Rules, 33
S.D. L. REV. 389 (1988) (examining the theories used by borrowers in lender liability as well
as defenses in collection or foreclosure actions); Glenn D. West & Michael P. Haggerty, The
"Demandable"Note and the Obligation of Good Faith,21 U.C.C. L.J. 99 (1988) (addressing
the obligation of good faith accompanying a note); Cheryl Anderson, Note, Lender Liability:
Breach of Good Faith in Lending and Related Theories, 64 N.D. L.REv. 273 (1988) (addressing lender liability theory for lack of good faith); Jill Pride Anderson, Comment, Lender
Liability for Breach of the Obligation of Good FaithPerformance, 36 EioRY L.J. 917 (1987)
(discussing the good faith obligation and its use to limit a lender's ability to exercise contractual rights and remedies); Sandra Chutorian, Note, Tort Remedies for Breach of Contract: The Expansion of Tortious Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair
Dealing into the Commercial Realm, 86 COLu . L. REV. 377 (1986) (arguing against a tort
for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing as a solution to the problem of bad faith conduct in the performance and termination of contracts); John Monaghan,
Note, Extending the Bad Faith Tort Doctrine to General Commercial Contracts,65 B.U. L.
REV. 355 (1985) (examining the "bad faith" doctrine in light of Seaman's Direct Buying
Serv. v. Standard Oil Co. and suggesting a standard for applying the doctrine); James Mabry Vickery, Note, A Special Relationship: The Use of the Duty of Good Faith and Fair
Dealing to Impose Tort Damages in Contracts Between Lender and Borrower, 9 REV. LIwG.
93 (1990).
17. See Paul Matthew Jones, Comment, Good Faith Theories of Lender Liability, 48
LA. L. REV. 1181 (1988). See also N.E. Betsworth, Note, Commercial Cotton Co. v. United
California Bank: California'sNewest Extension of Bad Faith Litigation Into Commercial
Law, 16 Sw. U. L. REV. 645 (1986) (discussing the use of a breach of good faith in commercial
banking law in a California case); James H. Cook, Comment, Seaman's Direct Buying Service, Inc. v. Standard Oil Co.: Tortious Breach of the Covenant of Good Faith and Fair
Dealing in a Noninsurance Commercial Contract Case, 71 IOWA L. REV. 893 (1986) (proposing guidelines for the adoption of good faith doctrine in a noninsurance commercial contract
case); Steven H. Hilfinger, Note, K.M.C. Co. v. Irving Trust Co.: DiscretionaryFinancing
and the Implied Duty of Good Faith, 81 Nw. U. L. REV. 539 (1987) (discussing the parameters of the good faith obligation imposed on lenders); Patricia A. Milon, Recent Development, Implied Covenants of Good Faith and Fair Dealing: Loose Canons of Liability of
FinancialInstitutions?, 40 VAND. L. REV. 1197 (1987) (exploring the judicial applications of
the duty of good faith and fair dealing to the activities of lenders in order to formulate
standards by which future lender liability suits might be assessed).
18. See Fischel, supra note 1, at 146-47 (arguing that the imposition of a fiduciary
duty on lenders is inappropriate in the typical lender liability case); See also Van Patten,
supra note 16, at 409-10 (arguing that "of all the theories of lender liability, the assertion of
a claim or defense based upon a breach of fiduciary duty by the lender has met with the
least success. In other words, most lender liability situations will not justify use of this theory"). But see Barrett v. Bank of Am., 229 Cal. Rptr. 16 (Ct. App. 1986) (stating that a
lender may have a fiduciary duty to its borrower); Barnett v. Hooper, 498 So. 2d 923 (Fla.
1986) (holding that bank owes a fiduciary duty to its customers); Deist v. Wachholz, 678
P.2d 188 (Mont. 1984) (holding that bank had a fiduciary duty to vendor for whom it acted
as financial adviser).
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rowers have asserted lender liability claims based on the theory of a
breach of a lender's fiduciary responsibilities, the results have been
mixed. 19 Courts have found the existence and breach of fiduciary duties
in particular circumstances, but have denied either their existence or
their breach in others. However, with relatively few exceptions, 0 courts
have generally found that there is no inherent inconsistency in the existence of a fiduciary relationship between borrowers and lenders, notwithstanding their traditional arm's-length roles as debtor and creditor.
This author's main concern with such judicial decisions, which is reflected in academic scholarship, 2' is the underlying presumption that a
fiduciary relation between a borrower and a lender is an exceptional,
rather than a normal and characteristic feature of the relationship. Because of this unfortunate presumption, it is widely believed that, although it may be "possible" for a fiduciary relation to exist and span the
great divide traditionally believed to separate borrowers from lenders, the
existence of such a duty is a rare and exceptional event. Accordingly,
many courts and scholars have concluded that the existence of a "special
relationship" between borrowers and lenders is a condition precedent to
22
any establishment of a fiduciary relation.
This article argues that this traditional and widely held presumption
is fundamentally flawed and demonstrates a misunderstanding of the very
nature of the relationship and of the bonding mechanisms2 3 inherent in
modern commercial transactions 24 between borrowers and lenders.2 In
19. For a discussion of the obligation between lender and borrower, see infra notes 72215 and accompanying text.
20. See Pardue v. Bankers First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 334 S.E.2d 926 (Ga. Ct. App.
1985) (holding that there is no confidential relationship between a lender and borrower and
noting that nothing in the statute "impose[d] a fiduciary duty generally upon banks ... or
a duty in particular to advise customers and debtors") (quoting National Bank v. Arnold,
240 S.E.2d 3 (Ga. 1981)). Id. at 927.
21. See, e.g., Fischel, supra note 1; Van Patten, supra note 16.
22. For a list of sources discussing the fiduciary relationship between lenders and borrowers, see supra note 18.
23. For a general discussion of bonding mechanisms and their importance to the borrower-lender relationship, see Fischel, supra note 1, at 134-40. See also Smith & Warner, On
Financial Contracting: An Analysis of Bonding Covenants, 7 J. FIN. ECON. 117 (1979);
Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior,
Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976); Charles J. Goetz &
Robert E. Scott, Principles of Relational Contracts,67 VA. L. REV. 1089 (1981) (examining
relational contracts in which one party has a good faith obligation to carry on activity that is
beneficial to the other party).
24. Actually, if taken to their logical conclusion, this article's views on this subject are
even more radical than they may at first appear, in that the author does not think that there
is anything unique to "modern" commercial transactions that makes fiduciary duties between a lender and a borrower any more normative than in those that came before the socalled "modern" commercial period. By the very nature of the transactional relationship
between borrowers and lenders, both today and from the very beginning of organized banking and lending practices, the fiducial relation has always been normative rather than exceptional with respect to many aspects of that relationship. The analysis here is primarily
restricted to modern transactions because, due to their highly structured nature, and the
significance of the stakes involved, it is especially clear in this context that such a normative
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advancing this theory, this article is not suggesting that the borrowerlender relationship is wholly and exclusively fiduciary in nature as that
which we have long understood to exist between principal and agent.26
Rather, the article suggests that the borrower-lender relationship, perhaps more than any other commercial relation in contemporary society,
has now evolved, in the tradition of Sir Henry Maine,27 into a dynamic
and complex tapestry, combining varying degrees of "status," "contract,"
and "fiduciary" principles.28 This article argues that the appropriate
relation must exist, at least with respect to some aspects of this relationship, and in fact it is
fundamental to the existence of the bank lending industry as we know it.
25. All references to the borrower and lender relationship in this article are expressly
limited to institutional (primarily banks and savings and loans) rather than private lenders,
and commercial rather than residential borrowers. All of the cases and academic commentary which are cited herein, with very rare exceptions, deal primarily with institutional lenders and commercial borrowers. However, this restriction should not raise any inference that
the observations and analysis do not apply with at least equal force in the context of the
"residential" borrower and institutional lender relationship. On the contrary, this article's
observations and analysis regarding the inherent nature of the fiduciary duties which lenders owe to their commercial borrowers, probably would apply with even greater precision,
force, and persuasiveness when the borrowers are residential rather than commercial in
character. Consequently, this particular aspect of the topic shall be left for a later time in a
forthcoming article so as to afford it the full and complete consideration and exploration
that it deserves. However, in that forthcoming piece the focus will be not only on the nature
of the residential borrowing relationship per se, but in particular will pay close attention to
those situations where racial minorities and people of color are concerned.
26. It is axiomatic that such "pure" and exclusive fiduciary duties govern the classic
agency relationship. See Fischel, supra note 1, at 146-47, where Professor Fischel points out
that such a "pure" fiduciary relationship is one wherein there is
an agreement in which one or more persons (the principal[s]) delegate authority
to another person (the agent) to perform some service or task on the principal's
behalf. Examples of agency relationships in commercial contexts include trustees
who manage money on behalf of others and corporate directors. In both cases,
fiduciary duties require the agent to act on behalf of the principal.
Id. at 146.
27. SIR HENRY MAINE, ANCIENT LAW, 160-70 (1861).
28. See Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Law, 71 CAL. L. REV. 795, 797-804 (1983), where
Professor Frankel generally describes and compares the important relations of "status,"
"contract," and "fiduciary" in terms of the following three important features:
(1) the contribution of the various relations to the desires and expectations of the parties;
(2) how each relation effects negotiating leverage between the parties; and (3) the law's influence on the parties' needs and expectations, vulnerability to coercion, and promotion of
the relation. Id. at 798.
In Frankel's article, he analyzes these features in their relationship with the relations of
status, contract, and fiduciary. In regards to status, the parties to such a relation are forced
to rely on each other in order to obtain both needs and desires. Frankel describes this relation in terms of a parent and child, where one party (the Power Bearer) has near or complete control and ability to satisfy the needs of the other (the Dependent). By virtue of his
monopoly, the Power Bearer can secure obedience from the Dependent by controlling the
satisfaction of the Dependent's needs. In response to this display of power, the Dependent
will bow to the Power Bearer in order to survive. The Power Bearer, however, must yield at
some point in order to further his interests, and thus gross abuse of power is avoided. Thus,
the parties survive in a quasi-symbiotic relationship that is controlled, to a great degree, by
the law, for it is the law, not the parties, that determines the beginning and ending of the
relation. Id. at 798-99.
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question is not whether there is generally a fiduciary relation between
borrowers and lenders, but rather, whether a fiduciary duty has arisen
with respect to a particular aspect of their relationship. 29 If such a duty
has arisen, then the next question is whether there is a causal link between the borrower's damages and the lender's breach of its corresponding fiduciary duty. Finally, if the answer to both of the preceding
questions is in the affirmative, the question then arises whether, as a matter of policy consistent with the equitable foundations of the fiduciary
obligation, the law ought to grant some form of relief to the borrower.
To develop this theory, Section I of this article examines the nature
of the fiduciary obligation from four important perspectives: the (a) history, (b) definition, (c) sources, and (d) purpose of fiduciary duties. Section II then examines the case law which has developed determining when
and under what circumstances a fiduciary relationship will arise between
Frankel also explains how contract relates to the aforementioned features. In a contract
relation, as in a status relation, the parties must rely upon each other in order to fulfill their
needs and desires. However, unlike the parties in a status relation, there is no Power Bearer,
and neither party can achieve his goals by use of force or monopoly of means. Rather than a
monopoly, a contract relation typifies the normal process associated with the creation of
contracts-bargaining and persuading the other party to make an exchange for the benefit
of both. It must not be forgotten, however, that the parties are adverse and each must strive
to protect his interests from his adversary. Id. at 799.
Contrary to parties in a status relation, parties in a contract relation "have many options for satisfying their needs." Needs are determined and evaluated and the parties bargain to obtain them, reaching agreements which may be enforced. "Contract frees each
party from domination by the other, making them more independent than in a status relation." Id. The price of this freedom, however, is the absence of security, for neither party to
the contract has an obligation to care for the other. The function of the law in such relations
is to "prohibit the use of force and monopoly, and to enforce the rules the parties freely set
for themselves. Id. at 800. It does not make the rules or the terms of the contract, but it
may serve to "facilitate the bargaining process ... [and] encourage markets to offer numerous options to each individual from which to satisfy his needs by exchange." Id.
Next, Frankel discusses the way in which the fiduciary relation relates to the denoted
features. He begins by explaining that in a fiduciary relation, one party (the Entrustor) is
dependent upon the other (the Fiduciary). While this may seem similar to the status relation, the dependence involved in a fiduciary relation is rarely as great as that displayed in
status relations. Dependence arises because the Entrustor must rely upon the fiduciary for a
particular service. This dependence, however, is balanced by the fact that the Fiduciary
does not have a monopoly on the means by which the Entrustor's needs may be satisfied.
The Fiduciary does not provide every service the Entrustor may wish. Rather, an Entrustor
often has the ability to choose his fiduciary from a group offering such services and may
negotiate the terms of the relation. Thus, any chance for a monopoly is usually destroyed.
Equality is further strengthened by the fact that the Fiduciary lacks the power to "manipulate the terms of his performance once the relation has been established." Id. at 801. "Thus,
fiduciary relations combine the bargaining freedom inherent in contract relations with a
limited form of the power and dependence of status relations .... Accordingly, the law of
status and fiduciary relations should, if possible, preserve the best aspects of status and
contract relations." Id.
29. See Deborah A. DeMott, Beyond Metaphor:An Analysis of FiduciaryObligation,
1988 DuKE L.J. 879 (1988). Professor DeMott argues that, "[a]lthough one can identify common core principles of fiduciary obligation, these principles apply with greater or lesser force
in different contexts involving different types of parties and relationshipships .... the law
of fiduciary obligation is situation-specific." Id. at 879.
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a commercial borrower and a lender. Section III provides a critique of the
law of fiduciary duty between borrowers and lenders as revealed in the
case analysis from Section II and based on the discussion in Section I.
Finally, Section IV suggests changes in the law which reflect a more enlightened relational model and management regime for the lender-borrower relationship. This model more closely reflects contemporary social
values, the reasonable and foreseeable expectations of today's commercial
players, and the needs of the banking industry and society as a whole.
I.

THE NATURE OF THE FIDUCIARY OBLIGATION

It is important to note as a threshold consideration that the term
"fiduciary obligation" and its adjective progeny" are extremely elusive
concepts and, as such, are "particularly resistant to precise definition."' 1
However, a clear and comprehensive definition of the term and an understanding of the concepts embodied within is essential to the development
of the proposed model in this article.
Any meaningful attempt to comprehend the true nature of "fiduciary
obligations" or of gaining a workable grasp of the character of the obligation's "fabric" must consider the following four areas: (1) historical development, (2) definitional intricacies, (3) distinct sources, and (4) the
unique purposes which the obligation serves in complex commercial relations.32 It is necessary to examine these four areas because only in this
way can we hope to fully appreciate the tremendously "unprecedented
expansion and development of fiduciary law" 3 in recent time and its sig30.

Most significant among such adjectival developments is the so-called "fiduciary

duty." For a more complete discussion of the process of defining fiduciary obligation in such
adjectival terms see, R.P. MEAGHER, ET. AL., EQUITY: DOCTRINES AND REMEDIES 130-60 (2d ed.
1984). See generally Kenneth B. Davis, Jr., Judicial Review of Fiduciary Decisionmaking-Some Theoretical Perspectives,80 Nw. U. L. REV. 1 (1985) (discussing fiduciary duty).
31. DeMott, supra note 29, at 881 (describing fiduciary obligation as "one of the most
elusive concepts in Anglo American law"). Id. at 879. See also, e.g., Steelvest, Inc. v. Scansteel Serv. Ctr., Inc. 807 S.W.2d 476 (Ky. 1991) (concluding that "because the circumstances
which may create a fiduciary relationship are so varied, it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to formulate a comprehensive definition of it that would fully and adequately embrace
all cases"). Id. at 485.
32. It has been persuasively and insightfully argued that the basic relations in our
society have evolved from status, to contract, to fiduciary relations. For example, Professor
Frankel has written that "a major reason for recognizing and developing a separate body of
fiduciary law is that our society is evolving into one based predominantly on fiduciary relations. The body of lay governing fiduciary relations can affect and be affected by this social
trend." Frankel, supra note 28, at 798. Professor Frankel further notes that
we are witnessing the emergence of a society predominantly based on fiduciary
relations. This type of society best reflects our contemporary social values. In
our society, affluence is largely produced by interdependence, but personal freedom is cherished. Society's members turn to an arbitrator, the government, to
obtain protection from personal coercion by those on whom they depend for specialized services. A fiduciary society attempts to maximize both the satisfaction
of needs and the protection of freedom.
Id. at 802 (footnote omitted).
33. Id. at 796.
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nificance for managing the borrower-lender relationship in a way which
more closely reflects contemporary social values and commercial
expectations.
A.

The Historical Development of Fiduciary Obligation
The concept of fiduciary obligation has its legal origins in equity,

through the English Court of Chancery. The chancery court's sole purpose was to reflect the conscience of the King as seen through the moral

considerations of the dictates of the church.3 4 Through this court's broad

grant of equitable jurisdiction, the Chancellor was empowered to grant
relief to petitioners where the law courts could not.3 5 Thus, the chancery
court could temper; correct; and, to the extent required by the equities of
particular cases, supplement the often harsh results mandated by "law."3 "
Such a system empowered the Chancellor to use his discretion in order to
fashion remedies based on broad principles of morality, considering what
was "right" and equitable in light of the then-existing community values.3 7 Consequently, the court of Equity, rather than being bound by re34. FLEMING JAMES,
1985).
35. Id. §§ 1.4-1.5.

JR.

&

GEOFFREY

C.

HAZARD, JR., CIVIL PROCEDURE §

1.6 (3d ed.

36. Id. This equitable bifurcation of jurisdiction and authority has been continued to
this day by many modern American court systems. Id. §1.5. Most notably, in the state of
Delaware (the state of incorporation for the vast majority of many American corporations)
the most prominent corporate law court-Delaware's Court of Chancery-was, and still is
today, a separate court of equity, operating with a self-consciously equitable style. See DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 341 (1974). The court has jurisdiction over traditionally equitable matters, such as trusts and guardianship proceedings, as well as all actions in which the plaintiff
seeks an equitable remedy. See First Nat'l Bank v. Andrews, 28 A.2d 676, 677 (Del. Ch.
1942). However, if the parties have sufficient remedies before any other court, the Court of
Chancery "shall not have jurisdiction to determine the matter." DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10,
§ 342 (1974). The fact that the Court of Chancery is a court of equity is also apparent by its
relationship with the Delaware Supreme Court. It is not unusual for the Supreme Court to
formulate rules in opinions which appear to be firm black letter law, but are in fact coupled
with express acknowledgments of Chancery's power to vary their application under the circumstances of a particular case. See, e.g., Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 815 n.8 (Del.
1984) (acknowledging Chancery's discretionary review in determining excuse of demand requirements in shareholder derivative actions). As a result, although a rule itself may not be
explicitly discretionary, discretion in interpretation and enforcement arises from the institutional fact that Chancery is a court of equity. "The perceived quality of Delaware's Chancery Court as a forum for corporate litigation provides a conventional justification for
Delaware's attractiveness as a situs for incorporation. This fact might well cause one to
question the wisdom of abolishing courts of equity in other jurisdictions." DeMott, supra
note 29, at 881 n.9. See generally JAMES, supra note 34, § 1.6 (3d ed. 1985) (discussing the
development and history of the parallel court systems of law and equity and their subsequent merger in many jurisdictions into a single court system).
37. See RENE DAVID & JOHN E.C. BRIERLEY, MAJOR LEGAL SYSTEMS IN THE WORLD ToDAY 342 (3d ed. 1985). See also L.S. Sealy, FiduciaryRelationships, 1962 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 69,
69-72 (discussing the branch of equity that deals with fiduciary relationships). See also DeMott, supra note 29, at 880 (noting that "[a]s equity evolved . . . established usages for
terms like 'trust' and 'confidence' replaced an earlier and imprecise vocabulary. The term
'fiduciary' itself was adopted to apply to situations falling short of 'trusts' but in which one
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stricted rules, developed for itself a flexible, situation-specific
jurisprudence. Since issues of fiduciary obligation fell under the jurisdiction of equity rather than law courts, the development and "evolution of
fiduciary obligation. . . owe[s] much to
the situation-specificity and flex38
ibility that were Equity's hallmarks.

B.

The Definition of Fiduciary Obligation

The meaning of the phrase "fiduciary obligation" is so broad, and the
circumstances under which such a relation can exist are so varied, that it
would be "unwise to attempt the formulation of any comprehensive definition that could be uniformly applied in every case." 39 Its elusive character notwithstanding, some general parameters and familiar core concepts
are discernable and firmly entrenched in the definition of "fiduciary obligation." It may be said that a fiduciary relationship exists, giving rise to
obligations of that character, where the relationship is confidential. In
such confidential relationships equity imposes duties upon the person in
whom confidence is reposed in order to prevent the abuse of the confidence.40 The Restatement of Torts defines a fiduciary relationship as one
which "exists between two persons when one of them is under a duty to
act for or to give advice for the benefit of another upon matters within
the scope of the relation."' 41 Black's Law Dictionary provides an equally
familiar and traditional definition. 4
person was nonetheless obliged to act like a trustee"). Id.
38. Id. at 881 (observing that "[flew areas of the law are as distinctly equitable in
character as fiduciary obligation and so few owe so little of their origin or subsequent development to the common law." Id. at 882 n.10. For a more general discussion on the subject of
how the enforcement of fiduciary duties is traditionally an equitable function, see 1 JOHN N.
POMEROY &

SPENCER

W. SYMIONS, A TREATISE

ON EQurrY JURISPRUDENCE

§§ 151, 157 (5th ed.

1941) and DAN B. DOBBS, REMEDIES § 2.3 (1973).
39. Warsofsky v. Sherman, 93 N.E.2d 612, 615 (Mass. 1950). See generally Davis,
supra note 30 (describing the rules that govern the general process of judicial review of
fiduciary decision making as a pragmatic accommodation of comparative difficulties with
legal relations and private ordering).
40. See generally 36A C.J.S. Fiduciary 381, 381-89 (1961) (defining fiduciary relationship); JOHN N. POMEROY & SPENCER W. SYMONS, A TREATISE ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE
§ 956a (5th ed. 1941) (noting fiduciary principles); Kurth v. Van Horn, 380 N.W.2d 693,
695-66 (Iowa 1986) (addressing the definition of "fiduciary relation"); see also First Bank of
Wakeeney v. Moden, 681 P.2d 11, 13 (Kan. 1984) (examining the definition of "fiduciary
relation"); Warsofsky v. Sherman, 93 N.E.2d 612, 615 (Mass. 1950) (seeking definition for
"fiduciary relationship").
41. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 874 cmt. a (1979).
42. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY defines the fiduciary relation as
a very broad term embracing both technical fiduciary relations and those informal relations which exist wherever one man trusts in or relies upon another. One
founded on trust or confidence reposed by one person in the integrity and fidelity of another. A "fiduciary relation" arises whenever confidence is reposed on
one side, and domination and influence result on the other; the relation can be
legal, social, domestic, or merely personal. Such relationship exists when there is
a reposing of faith, confidence and trust, and the placing of reliance by one upon
the judgment and advice of the other.
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Consistent with these broad outlines, some of the most oft cited indicia of the existence of a fiduciary relationship include: the acting of one
party for another, the dominance or extensive influence of one party over
the other, the dependence of one party on the other, inequality of bargaining positions, and the repose of trust and confidence in one party by
the other.43 In a classic and frequently cited definition of fiduciary relation, Lord Chelmsford wrote that such a relation existed:
[W]henever two persons stand in such a relation that, while it continues, confidence is necessarily reposed by one, and the influence which
naturally grows out of that confidence is possessed by the other, and
this confidence is abused, or the influence is exerted to obtain an advantage at the expense of the confiding party, the person so availing
himself of his position will not be permitted to retain the advantage,
although the transaction could not have been impeached if no such confidential relation had existed.""
Lord Chelmsford's characterization is especially insightful, because it
shows that in determining the existence of a breach of trust, the court
must examine the particular relationship in question rather than the normal relation of the parties. 45 Invariably, despite the wide breadth encompassed by the nature of a fiduciary obligation, virtually every
commentator or court that has had occasion to define its meaning consistently employs such terms as "trust," "confidence," and "influence."' e It is
equally clear from all quarters that courts of equity have declined to narrowly define the specific incidents of fiduciary relations based on a desire
to leave the area open for new development. 47 These courts have, however, expressed that such obligations should be imposed whenever "confidence [is] reposed on one side [with] resulting domination and influence
on the other.4 1 However, while no single and invariable rule has emerged
to determine the existence of a fiduciary relationship, most courts which
have considered the question have concluded that "it is manifest in all
the decisions that there must be not only confidence of one in the other,
but there must exist a certain inequality, dependence, weakness of age, of
mental strength, business intelligence, knowledge of the facts involved or
other conditions giving to one an advantage over the other.' 49
564, (5th ed. 1979) (citations omitted).
43. First Bank of Wakeeney, 681 P.2d at 13.
44. Tate v. Williamson, 2 Ch. 55, 61 (1866). See also Warsofsky, 93 N.E.2d at 615
(quoting Tate v. Williamson); M L. Stewart & Co. v. Marcus, 207 N.Y.S. 685, 689 (Sup. Ct.
1924) (quoting Tate v. Williamson).
45. M.L. Stewart, 207 N.Y.S. at 690.
46. See, e.g., Frankel, supra note 28, at 829-30 (stating that "[c]ourts regulate fiduciaries by imposing a high standard of morality upon them. This moral theme is an important
part of fiduciary law. Loyalty, fidelity, faith and honor from its basic vocabulary.") (emphasis added).
47. 36A C.J.S. Fiduciary,381, 385-87.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 920; Denison State Bank v. Maderia, 640 P.2d 1235, 1241 (Kan. 1982) (quoting Yuster v. Keefe, 90 N.E. 920, 922 (Ind. Ct. App. 1910). See also Koening v. Leas, 165
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
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Upon reading this definition, one might be struck by the absence of a
reliance requirement. This missing element of reliance is perhaps one of
the more interesting and often misunderstood aspects of the fiduciary obligation. Although many cases discuss the question of whether a borrower
actually relied on the lender, and, if so, whether such reliance was reasonable under the circumstances, the fiduciary relation does not require reliance, reasonable or otherwise. One scholar expressed this point quite
clearly when he wrote, "the law entitles the entrustor to rely on the fiduciary's trustworthiness. The entrustor is therefore not required to show
that he actually relied on the fiduciary, and the fiduciary has the burden
of justifying self-dealing transactions." 50
While this result may be counterintuitive at some level, it is, in fact,
consistent with the nature and purpose of the fiduciary obligation. As one
court noted:
[t]he heightened duty inherent in a fiduciary relationship justifies imposing liability for breach of that duty regardless of good faith or lack
of damage to the beneficiary, because such a standard "is not based on
harm done to the beneficiary in the particular case, but rests upon a
broad principle of preventing conflict of opposing interests in the minds
of fiduciaries, whose duty it is to act solely for the benefit of their
beneficiaries."51
Such a rule can be quite effective, prophalactically, in preventing a fiduciary from abusing its power, and thus it furthers the equitable goals that
underlie the obligation.
C. The Sources of Fiduciary Obligation
As a general proposition, the origins of a fiduciary obligation between
parties flow from two distinct and independent sources.52 The first and
most traditional source of the fiduciary obligation consists of relationships specifically and expressly created by a contract between the parties.5 3 The second and more troublesome source consists of situations
where the obligation merely arises out of the relationship between the
N.E. 2d 134, 137 (Ind. 1960) (quoting same language from Yuster). Garrett v. Bankwest,
Inc., 459 N.W.2d 833, 838 (S.D. 1990); Mash v. Cutler, 488 N.W.2d 642, 652 (1992) (holding
that in order to succeed on a claim for breach of fiduciary duty, the claimant must be "in a
position of inequality, dependence, weakness or lack of knowledge") (quoting Union State
Bank v. Woell, 434 N.W.2d 712, 721 (N.D. 1989); Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Fordham,
130 B.R. 632, 648 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1991) (stating that "[a] party owed a fiduciary obligation
is often in a position of inequality, inferiority, or other disadvantage).
50. Frankel, supra note 28, at 824-25.
51. Federal Say. & Loan Ins. Corp. v Molinaro, 889 F.2d 899, 904 (9th Cir. 1989)
(quoting

RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF RESTITUTION §

197 cmt. c (1937).

52. See Denison State Bank v. Madeira, 640 P.2d 1235, 1241 (Kan. 1982).
53. Id. "Generally, there are two types of fiduciary relationships: (1) those specifically
created by contract such as principal and agent ... and (2) those implied in law due to the
factual situation surrounding the involved transactions and the relationship of the parties to
each other and to the questioned transaction." Id. The analytical focus of this article is on
"relational" fiduciary obligations rather than "contractual" ones.
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parties. 4
Typical of contractual fiduciary obligations are those between principal and agent, trustee and cestui que trust, attorney and client, and similar relations.5 These contractual fiduciary obligations present few
problems either for the courts or for scholars.58 Since the existence of fiduciary obligation is clear in such cases, the only areas of dispute are
whether the complained of action constitutes a breach of that duty, and if
so what the appropriate measure of damages should be.
Relational or transactional fiduciary obligations are considerably
more problematic for both the courts and scholars. The first question in
such cases is whether the individual facts and circumstances of the relationship between the parties and the relationship of the parties to the
transaction, reasonably gave rise to the existence of a fiduciary obligation.5 7 If this question is answered in the negative, the inquiry is necessarily at an end. However, if the answer is affirmative, issues similar to
those raised in the contractual context must also be dealt with, i.e.
whether the alleged conduct did in fact breach the fiduciary obligation,
and, if so, what the proper measure of damages should be. Because the
concept of fiduciary obligation is both elusive and equitable by nature,
the judicial inquiry is by necessity extremely fact sensitive. Therefore, all
such disputes must be resolved on a case-by-case basis.58
This distinction between contractual and relational or transactional
fiduciary obligations can be somewhat misleading when discussing the
lender-borrower relationship. This confusion is caused by the fact that all
such relationships are governed for the most part by express contracts. At
the very least, each such relationship typically consists of a number of
express contracts such as: the commitment letter, the security agreement,
a mortgage, and a promissory note, collectively known as "loan documentation." Nowhere in the typical loan documentation is there ever either
an express or implied covenant or condition that would, on its own, create
a fiduciary relationship between the parties. In fact, often there are express provisions specifically disclaiming fiduciary obligations.59 However,
54. Id. See Umbaugh Pole Bldg. Co. v. Scottt, 390 N.E.2d 320, 323 (Ohio 1979) ("A
fiduciary relationship may be created out of an informal relationship, but this is done only
when both parties understand that a special trust or confidence has been reposed."). See
also Logsdon v. National City Bank, 601 N.E.2d 262, 269 (Ohio C.P. 1991) (stating that
"[s]uch a relationship may be specifically created by contract, or it 'may. . .arise out of an
informal relationship where both parties to a transaction understand that a special trust or
confidence has been reposed.' ") (quoting Blon v. Bank One, 519 N.E.2d 363, 367 (Ohio

1988)).
55. Denison, 640 P.2d at 1241.
56. Id.
57. See Curtis v. Freden, 585 P.2d 993, 998 (Kan. 1978).
58. Denison, 640 P.2d at 1241.
59. One notable exception to this general rule is sometimes found in the loan documentation between and among banks that participate in funding a single loan obligation,
referred to as "participation agreements." See, e.g., Women's Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v.
Nevada Nat'l Bank, 811 F.2d 1255 (9th Cir. 1987). In this case, a participation agreement
between the banks specifically provided that Nevada National Bank was to "act as a trustee
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it must be remembered that, despite the express language of the parties'
contracts, it is their relationship which gives rise to fiduciary duties and
claims for a breach of trust.6 0 Thus, regardless of the express language
found in loan documentation or even the nominal relationship between
the parties, it is possible for a fiduciary duty to arise from the conduct of
the parties alone, even where none was originally intended.6
This is not to say, however, that a fiduciary obligation can be thrust
upon a lender without either his express or implied consent. Due to the
nature of the obligation, one of its most essential and fundamental
sources is the consent of the parties, either express or implied from the
surrounding circumstances. 2 In discussing this very issue the court in
M.L. Stewart & Co. v. Marcus6 3 wrote that
[o]f course no man can obtrude either his trust or his secrets upon another, to the extent of imposing upon the other any obligation in regard
thereto, any more than he can render another his bailee in invitum. In
that respect banks present a constant invitation to intending borrowers,
and thus subject themselves to whatever implication or obligation is to
be drawn from that fact.6
Similarly, the court in Pommier v. Peoples Bank Maycrest,5 in discussing the domination of one party by another, observed not only that
"the essence of a fiduciary relationship is that one party is dominated by
with fiduciary duties" to protect the interests of Women's Federal Savings and Loan Association. Id. at 1258. Despite the apparent clarity of this provision, Nevada National Bank
argued that the language was "superfluous, and did not impose any enforceable duties on
[it]." The court, however, was unpersuaded and declined to accept Nevada National Bank's
"restrictive view" of the loan agreement. Id. at 1259. See also First Citizens Fed. Sav. &
Loan Ass'n v. Worthen Bank & Trust Co., 919 F.2d 510 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that loan
participation agreement naming bank as trustee did not create a fiduciary duty between
bank and other participating institutions); Frankel, supra note 28, at 822 (explaining that
"explicit contractual waiver provisions do not remove fiduciary relations from the court's
supervision, but may merely affect the extent of judicial review over the fiduciary's use of
his power").
60. M.L. Stewart & Co. v. Marcus, 207 N.Y.S. 685, 690 (Sup. Ct. 1924).
61. See, e.g., Pommier v. Peoples Bank Marycrest, 967 F.2d 1115 (7th Cir. 1992). "It is
possible that the particular circumstances surrounding a relationship will make it a fiduciary
relationship, even if the general class of debtor-creditor relationships is not." Id. at 1119
(citing Santa Claus Indus. v. First Nat'l Bank, 576 N.E.2d 326, 330 (Ill. Ct. App. 1991); MidAmerica Nat'l Bank v. First Sav. & Loan, 515 N.E.2d 176, 180 (Ill. Ct. App. 1987)).
62. See, e.g., M.L. Stewart, 207 N.Y.S. at 689, where the court, while describing the
nature of the fiduciary obligation, the court stated that "[ilt is, of course clear that a trust
or fiduciary relation in its strict sense ... is created only by mutual consent, express or
implied." The court further explained that the one notable exception to this rule is the
"constructive trust" which "is the formula through which the conscience of equity finds
expression. When property has been acquired in such circumstances that the holder of the
legal title may not in good conscience retain the beneficial interest, equity converts him into
a trustee." Id. (quoting Justice Cardozo in Beatty v. Guggenheim Exploration Co., 122 N.E.
378, 380 (N.Y. 1919)).
63. 207 N.Y.S. 685 (Sup. Ct. 1924).
64. Id. at 692.
65. 967 F.2d 1115 (7th Cir. 1922).
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the other ... [but] ... the dominant party must accept the responsibil-

ity, accept the trust of the other party before a court can find a fiduciary
relationship. ' 6 In emphasizing the importance of this acceptance, one
scholar noted that generally, courts will only find a fiduciary relationship
when both the repose
of trust and the invitation or acceptance of such
6 7
trust are present.

D. The Purpose of the Fiduciary Obligation
Beyond the functions already identified, the fiduciary obligation also
serves to reduce the economic costs associated with conducting complex
commercial transactions. One prestigious team of scholars has described
the process this way: "The fiduciary principle is an alternative to direct
monitoring. It replaces prior supervision with deterrence, much as the
criminal law uses penalties for bank robbery rather than pat-down
66. Id. at 1119. It is interesting to note that although M.L. Stewart was a 1924 New
York case and Pommier was a 1992 Illinois case, they similarly illustrated a requirement of
consent before a fiduciary obligation is imposed. In M.L. Stewart the court noted the bank's
act of inviting loan customers to do business with it, and thereby inferentially holding itself
out to be expert in the field of making loans. The bank was thus responsible for the reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom. In Pommier, the court similarly noted that "[t]he fact
that one party trusts the other is insufficient [to establish a fiduciary obligation]." Pommier,
967 F.2d at 1119. The court quoted Burdett v. Miller, 957 F.2d 1375 (7th Cir. 1992), for the
proposition that "[i]f a person solicits another to trust him in matters in which he represents himself to be expert as well as trustworthy and the other is not expert and accepts the
offer and reposes complete trust in him, a fiduciary relation is established." Pommier, 967
F.2d at 1119 (quoting Burdett, 957 F.2d at 1381). See Frankel, supra note 28, at 820. Professor Frankel explains that
[u]nlike status relations, fiduciary relations are not mandated by law. The fiduciary is free to enter or refrain from entering the relation, and cannot be forced to
serve without his consent. While the entrustor cannot be forced to enter into the
relation, he is not always required to consent to the relation, because he is the
beneficiary of the law's protection. Thus, the law is merely permissive with respect to the parties' decision to enter into the relation.
Once a relation is established, however, its classification as fiduciary and its
legal consequences are primarily determined by the law rather than the parties.
Thus, unlike a party to a contract, a person may find himself in a fiduciary relation without ever having intended to assume fiduciary obligations. The courts
will look to whether the arrangement formed by the parties meets the criteria for
classification as fiduciary, not whether the parties intended the legal consequences of such a relation. If the criteria are satisfied, the fiduciary will be subject to the duties flowing from that relation, and the entrustor will be entitled to
the resulting legal protection.
Id. at 820-21 (footnotes omitted). See also Dolton v. Capitol Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 642
P.2d 21, 23-24 (Colo. Ct. App. 1981) (holding that borrower-lender fiduciary duty may exist
when there is trust by the borrower and acceptance by the lender); Klein v. First Edina
Nat'l Bank, 196 N.W.2d 619, 623 (Minn. 1972) (holding that when a customer places trust in
a bank and relies on it for counsel, special circumstances, which may create a duty, arise if
the bank is aware of the trust and reliance); Pigg v. Robertson, 549 S.W.2d 597 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1977) (finding a confidential relationship where the lender accepted borrower's trust).
67. Richard B. Hagedorn, The Impact of Fiduciary Principleson the Bank-Customer
Relationship in Washington, 16 WILLAr1zrr L. REV. 803, 806 (1980) (footnote omitted).

HeinOnline -- 29 Wake Forest L. Rev. 734 1994

1994]

BANKING LAW

searches of everyone entering banks."6 8 The fiduciary principle acts as a
standard penalty clause in every agency contract, and its flexibility allows
it to conform to both the foreseen and unforeseen interests of the parties.6 9 In this way, the fiduciary obligation can be accurately characterized
as an "off the rack" rule, which the law supplies, but which optimally
approximates the bargain that the parties would have made had they
been able to (a) bargain without incurring the high costs associated with
the time and effort necessarily attendant to the effort, and (b) foresee the
many contingencies and possibilities which their relative distribution of
70
power, information, and opportunity might provide.
By reducing the inherently high economic costs of direct monitoring
and detailed bargaining, or economizing the transaction costs associated
with the relationship, the fiduciary obligation serves a particularly useful
function. This is because the vulnerability of the entrustor and the potential for the fiduciary to abuse his power are both quite substantial. However, it is extremely important to note in this regard that the
entrustor's vulnerability to abuse of power does not result from an initial inequality of bargaining power between the entrustor and the fiduciary. In no sense are fiduciary relations and the risks they create for
the entrustor similar to adhesion contracts or unfair bargains. The relation may expose the entrustor to risk even if he is sophisticated, informed, and able to bargain effectively. Rather, the entrustor's
vulnerability stems from the structure and nature of the fiduciary relation. The delegated power that enables the fiduciary to benefit the entrustor also enables him to injure the entrustor, because the purpose for
which the fiduciary is allowed to use his delegated power is narrower
7
than the purposes for which he is capable of using that power. 1
68. Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Corporate Control Transactions, 91
YALE LJ. 698, 702 (1981).
69. Id.
70. Id. Contracts in which parties are incapable of reducing all of the important terms
of their relationship to specific and well defined terms have been denoted as "relational
contracts." Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Principlesof Relational Contracts,67 VA. L.
REV. 1089, 1091 (1981). In the context of complex contractual arrangements, the parties are
simply unable to anticipate future conditions or adequately gauge them even when the risks
are known. Id. at 1091. As a result, "it becomes extremely costly-if not literally impossible-for parties constrained by bounded rationality to describe the complete decision tree at
the time of bargaining." Id. at 1090 n.4 (citation omitted). In response to these conditions of
complexity and uncertainty the parties enter into relational contracts, such as fiduciary relations, in an effort to exploit certain economies. Id. at 1092. In addition, because the parties
have reciprocal needs to economize on transaction costs, they typically select a mix of monitoring and bonding arrangements. Id. at 1093. These arrangements assure each party that
the other will not take harmful actions, which they would otherwise be contractually free to
do. Id. at 1093 n.12. Further, such arrangements may be drafted to ensure that if harmful
actions are taken the injured party will be compensated. Id. (citing Jensen, supra note 23, at
308).
71. Frankel, supra note 28, at 810. See, e.g., M.L. Stewart & Co. v. Marcus, 207 N.Y.S.
685 (Sup. Ct. 1924). The court in this case notes that
if a person applies for a loan, and in connection with application discloses his
purpose to avail of a bargain which he had not as yet closed by contract, and of
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THE FIDUCIARY OBLIGATION BETWEEN LENDER AND BORROWER

The courts are virtually unanimous in holding that the basic relationship between lenders and borrowers is an arm's-length transaction between creditors and debtors.7 2 However, they diverge rather sharply
regarding the extent to which nominal relationship can or should ever
give rise to fiduciary obligations by the lender. In this respect the decisions can be viewed as falling into four distinct categories: (1) a distinct
minority of courts have held that fiduciary obligations are fundamentally
inconsistent with the very nature of a lender-borrower relationship and
thus should never be imposed; (2) a substantial majority have held that
fiduciary obligations can arise under "special circumstances" or where
there is a "special relationship" between the parties; (3) a small and
highly controversial minority of courts have held that the lender-borrower
relationship is at least "quasi-fiduciary"; and (4) a small but highly regarded minority of courts have held that there are a number of usual,
normal and discrete aspects of the lender-borrower relationship which
give rise to fiduciary obligations by their very nature.
A. A Fiduciary Obligation is Inconsistent With the Lender-Borrower
Relationship
A great number of courts have been directly presented with the question of whether there are circumstances under which a lender, who is otherwise in an arm's-length relationship with a commercial borrower, may
acquire a fiduciary obligation. Only a distinct minority have held that
such an obligation is fundamentally inconsistent with the very nature of
the lender-borrower relationship. In a relatively recent Georgia case, a
bank offered borrowers a lump sum discounted mortgage payoff plan of a
loan prepayment. 73 However, the discounts for the mortgage prepayment
resulted in a federal tax liability to the borrowers of several million dollars. The borrowers, who were not informed by the bank that such tax
consequences were possible, brought suit for five million dollars in actual
which the lender had not previously heard, the courts, whether of law or equity,
would afford some form of adequate relief in case the applicant was forestalled
in his project by the lender.
Id. at 692.
72. See, e.g., Aaron Ferer & Sons, Ltd. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 731 F.2d 112, 122
(2d Cir. 1984) (stating that "[a] correspondent-bank relationship, standing alone, does not
create an agency relationship"); Black Canyon Racquetball Club, Inc. v. Idaho First Nat'l
Bank, 804 P.2d 900, 905 (Idaho 1991) (affirming the rule that "the relationship in a lenderborrower situation is a debtor-creditor relationship and not a fiduciary relationship"); Blon
v. Bank One, 519 N.E.2d 363, 367 (Ohio 1988) (holding that bank/lender did not have a
special relationship of trust and confidence and thus had no duty to disclose); Burwell v.
South Carolina Nat'l Bank, 340 S.E.2d 786, 790 (S.C. 1986) (holding that status as a depositor during negotiations of loan guarantees was "insufficient to create a fiduciary relationship

with the bank").
73. Pardue v. Bankers First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 334 S.E.2d 926, 926 (Ga. Ct. App.
1985).
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and punitive damages as well as for attorney's fees. 74 The borrowers alleged that in failing to disclose this tax consequence which was known to
the bank but not to the borrowers, the bank breached a fiduciary duty to
them. 7 5 The bank prevailed on its motion to dismiss in the trial court and
on appeal. 76 In finding for the bank, the trial court held that "[t]he complaint shows no fiduciary duty to disclose a matter that was on public
record and equally accessible to plaintiffs and no special relationship ex'
isted between the parties other than lender and borrower." 7
In affirming the trial court's dismissal of the borrower's claim, the
court of appeals went even further, stating that
[w]e agree completely with the trial court, and find no basis whatever
to support a fiduciary duty between lender and borrower or bank and
customer which would impose a duty upon the bank or savings and
loan association to advise appellants concerning their tax status....
"There is no confidential [or fiduciary] relationship between a bank and
its customers merely because the customer had advised with, relied
upon, and trusted the bankers in the past."78
In reaching this result, the Pardue court made it clear that its holding
proceeded from its notion of the very nature of the bank-borrower relationship when they stated, "the lender-borrower relationship is particularly inapposite to a confidential relationship because debtors and
creditors have conflicting interests." ' 9 Notwithstanding a long history of
advice given by the bank to the borrowers, and a clear record of trust,
confidence, and reliance by the borrowers on the bank, the appellate
court was so unmoved that they concluded that "even if the bank had
advised the borrowers of tax liability and had misled them, the borrowers
would not have been entitled to rely on this advice. Rather, the borrowers
would have to conduct their own inquiries into possible tax liability."80
The decision in Pardue is typical of that minority of cases which hold
that, as a matter of principle, the nature of the bank-borrower relationship is such that the imposition of a fiduciary duty is never appropriate.
It is especially interesting to note that the Pardue court foreclosed such
an option, even if the bank had engaged in intentionally misleading conduct that bordered on, if not actually amounted to, fraud; or at the very
least, fraud in the inducement. To reiterate this conclusion is based on
the court's view of the participants in the bank-borrower relationship as
adversaries, across the negotiating table. In such a relationship, a borrower who relies on representations by the bank does so at his peril and
may look only to himself and his own paid advisors, e.g. attorneys, ac74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
1977)).
79.
80.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 926-27 (quoting Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank v. Arnold, 240 S.E.2d 3, 4 (Ga.
Id. at 927.
Id. (citing Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank v. Arnold, 240 S.E.2d 3 (Ga. 1977)).
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countants and the like, for advice upon which he may justifiably rely."1
A similar result occurred at the district court level in the recent case
of Reid v. Key Bank of Southern Maine, Inc.,8 2 where the court held that
a confidential or fiduciary relationship between a bank and a borrower "is
excluded in principle; to hold otherwise ... would disrupt a whole sys-83
tem of credit that exists in the economic marketplace in this country.
On appeal, although affirming the result, the First Circuit Court of Appeals stated that it had "reservations about the sweeping legal rule announced by the district court."84 The First Circuit then reviewed cases
from other jurisdictions dealing with this issue and found them to be
split. A minority firmly stated that no fiduciary relationship existed between a bank and a borrower. 85 Conversely, the majority of jurisdictions
held that a fiduciary relationship could "arise when a customer reposes
trust in a bank and relies on the bank for financial advice, or in other
special circumstances."8 6
Although the Reid court observed that there were no Maine cases
directly on point, it went so far as to say that "were they presented with
the question, [the Maine courts] might agree with the majority view that
such relations cannot be excluded per se from the context of banks and
their depositors or loan customers. '87 Notwithstanding this stated predisposition, the Reid court nevertheless held that on the evidence before
it, there was insufficient factual particularity regarding the details of the
relationship between the lender and the borrower for "an accurate determination of the matter." 's
Similarly, in another recent case, Centerre Bank of Kansas City v.
Distributors,Inc., 9 the Missouri Court of Appeals flatly held that as a
matter of law no confidential or fiduciary relationship exists between a
bank and its borrowers.90 This case is particularly noteworthy because the
bank involved requested personal guaranties from the borrowing company's principals, as well as from their wives and parents.91 Three days
after receiving the requested personal guaranties, the bank issued the
81. See id. at 927.
82. 821 F.2d 9 (1st Cir. 1987).
83. Id. at 16-17 (quoting the district court's unreported opinion).
84. Id. at 17.
85. Id. (citing Centerre Bank v. Distributors, Inc., 705 S.W.2d 42 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985)).
86. Id. (quoting Baylor v. Jordan, 445 So. 2d 254, 256 (Ala. 1984)).
87. Id.
88. Id. (citation omitted). The only evidence that the borrower offered for proof of a
confidential relationship was the high quality of the working relationship between himself
and the bank loan officer. However, the only advice which the bank officer had offered the
borrower was to recommend a particular supplier and a particular accountant. Id. On the
basis of these facts, the court found that the evidence was very "vague" with respect to any
faith, trust, or reliance reposed in the bank by the borrower. Id. at 17-18.
89. 703 S.W.2d 42 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985).
90. Id. at 53 tciting Delta Diversified, Inc. v. Citizens & -. Nat'l Bank, 320 S.E.2d 767,
776 (Ga. Ct. App. 1984)).
91. Id. at 45.
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company a sixty-day demand notice of the loan. 92 The guarantors claimed
the existence and breach of a fiduciary obligation because, by the bank's
own admission, at the time the bank requested the personal guaranties it
did not consider the loan to be a "good loan" and had in fact made an
internal classification of the loan on their "problem loan list. ' 93 None of
this information was disclosed to the guarantors.94 Moreover, despite this
internal bank classification, the bank had assured the company's principals that, if the guaranties were provided, the loan would be continued.
Notwithstanding these facts, the court held that the guarantors could not
avoid their liabilities on such guaranties because the bank was under no
"legal or equitable obligation to communicate" 95 the withheld information
to them, nor were they entitled to any such communication. This case,
along with the Pardue and Reid cases, is typical of those cases which
flatly deny the possibility of a fiduciary relationship in the borrowerlender context.
B. A Fiduciary Obligation Between Lenders and Borrowers Can Arise
Under Special Circumstances or Where a Special Relationship Exists
Courts are often reluctant to find a fiduciary relationship running
from a lender to its borrower, due to the fundamental view that the normal lending relationship is a product of arms-length bargaining."' To require a lender to act as a fiduciary in such a situation would be
anomolous, since it would then be required to protect the interests of an
adverse party in the bargaining process.17 Generally, the lender-borrower
relationship is simply that of debtor and creditor, which does not give rise
to fiduciary obligations.9 However, under certain circumstances and iri
special situations, this general rule is significantly altered. The Washington Court of Appeals described this relationship with clarity in the
case of Tokarz v. FrontierFederal Savings & Loan Ass'n:100
As a general rule, the relationship between a bank and a depositor or
customer does not ordinarily impose a fiduciary duty of disclosure upon
92. Id.
93. Id. This indicated that the bank considered the loan to be a high risk of loss.
94. See id.
95. See id. at 53.
96. Weinberger v. Kendrick, 698 F.2d 61, 79 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 818
(1983). See also Umbaugh Pole Bldg. Co. v. Scott, 390 N.E.2d 320, 323 (Ohio 1979) (finding
that although advice was given by the lender in a sincere effort to help the borrower, the
fact that the lender was an institution and the transaction was commercial put the parties
at arm's length despite appearances). While not foreclosing the possibility of a fiduciary
obligation created by an informal relationship, the Umbaugh court concluded that "this is
done only when both parties understand that a special trust or confidence has been reposed." Id. See also Snow v. Merchants Nat'l Bank, 35 N.E.2d 213, 217 (Mass. 1941) (discussing the creation of fiduciary relationships in commercial settings).
97. Weinberger, 698 F.2d at 79.
98. See Deist v. Wachholz, 678 P.2d 188 (Mont. 1984).
99. See id.
100. 656 P.2d 1089 (Wash. Ct. App. 1983).
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the bank. They deal at arm's-length. However, "special circumstances"
may dictate otherwise: one who speaks must say enough to prevent his
words from misleading the other party; one who has special knowledge
of material facts to which the other party does not have access may
have a duty to disclose these facts to the other party; and one who
stands in a confidential or fiduciary relation to the other party to a
transaction must disclose other facts. Present-day commercial transactions are not, as in past generations, primarily for cash; rather modem
banking practices involve a highly complicated structure of credit and
other complexities which often thrust a bank into the role of an advisor,
thereby creating a relationship of trust and confidence which may result in a fiduciary duty upon the bank to disclose facts when dealing
with the customer. 1 '
Of course, the Washington Court of Appeals was not the first court to
consider this issue and to hold that where there was evidence of a special
relationship or circumstance, a bank's otherwise arm's-length relationship
to its customers could become fiduciary in nature. As far back as 1937,
the Arizona Supreme Court, in03Stewart v. Phoenix National Bank 02 had
reached the same conclusion.
Beyond the particular facts of the individual case, courts which have
considered the question of whether a special relationship or special circumstances exist between a lender and a borrower have given little express prospective guidance regarding the elemental constituents of such
relationships or circumstances. Any insight into the elements of these relationships and circumstances must therefore be a product of reviewing,
distilling and marshaling the common ground found in each of the major
cases. A careful review of the cases in this area reveals that they share
some common thoughts regarding what constitutes a "special relationship" or a "special circumstance." These common thoughts are based
upon the following three categories of factors: (a) the borrower reposing
special trust and/or confidence in the lender;104 (b) the borrower receiving
101. Id. at 1092 (citing Stewart v. Phoenix Nat'l Bank, 64 P.2d 101, 106 (Ariz. 1937));
Richfield Bank & Trust v. Sjogren, 244 N.W.2d 648 (Minn. 1976); Klein v. First Edina Nat'l
Bank, 196 N.W.2d 619 (Minn. 1972); Pigg v. Robertson, 1549 S.W. 597, 600 (Mo. Ct. App.
1977).
102. 64 P.2d 101 (Ariz. 1937).
103. Id. at 106. Although the court in M.L. Stewart framed its analysis in terms of a
"confidential relationship" and "confidential relations," it is important to note that, for the
most part, the overwhelming majority of cases in this area consider the terms "confidential"
and "fiduciary" to be synonymous and interchangeable. See, e.g., Reid v. Key Bank of S.
Maine, Inc., 821 F.2d 9, 16 n.4 (1st Cir. 1987) (stating that "[in Maine, 'fiduciary' and
'confidential relations' are legal equivalents"); Barrett Bank v. Bank of Am., 229 Cal. Rptr.
16, 20 (Ct. App. 1986) (stating that "[c]onfidential and fiduciary relations are, in law, synonymous"). See also Fridenmaker v. Valley Nat'l Bank, 534 P.2d 1064 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1975)
(agreeing with M.L. Stewart rule); Bank of Am.v. Sanchez, 38 P.2d 787, 789 (Cal. Ct. App.
1934) (noting that fiduciary relations are not limited to legal relations, but "may be moral,
social, domestic, or merely personal").
104. For a discussion of special circumstances on which the borrower resposes trust or
confidence in the lender, see infra notes 106-154 and accompanying text.
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and relying on advice rendered by the lender;' 05 and (c) the lender gaining superiority, influence, dominion or control over the borrower. 0 6 These
categories are rarely sharply defined, and cases often mix and mingle
them in a variety of combinations and permutations. Additionally, courts
often require that the lender have knowledge of one of the factors, either
expressly or by reason of the circumstances, and have accepted it.
1.

Reposing special trust or confidence in the Lender

In the absence of bargained-for fiduciary relations, the courts look at
surrounding circumstances to determine whether a special relation exists
between the borrower and the lender. When the borrower reposes trust or
confidence in the lender, many courts will find that the lender owed the
borrower a fiduciary duty. Courts are more likely to find a fiduciary duty
if the bank knew or had reason to know that the borrower had reposed
trust and confidence in the bank. The following cases illustrate the
court's willingness to examine the circumstances surrounding a lenderborrower relationship with an emphasis on the trust and confidence of the
borrower and the knowledge and conduct of the owner. In Barnett Bank
07
v. Hooper,1
the Supreme Court of Florida held that a bank officer's confirmation of the soundness of the borrower's proposed investment coupled
with the borrower's long-standing relationship with the bank, was sufficient to create a confidential relationship. 0 The court held that a bank
may have a duty to disclose material facts to a customer with whom it has
established a relationship of trust and confidence, where it has special
knowledge that may be critical to the customer. 0 9
In Barnett Bank, the bank's customer had been engaged in business
with the bank since 1973.10 In 1981 the customer met with a tax shelter
adviser named Hosner, who arranged a meeting between the customer
and the bank."' At that meeting, the bank confirmed that it was familiar
with Hosner and his business and the loan officer in charge of Hosner's
accounts affirmed the viability of the business. 1 2 The officer further informed the customer that Hosner Enterprises was sound and had passed
IRS scrutiny.' The customer then borrowed $50,000 from the bank and
4
invested it with Hosner."
A few months following this initial investment, the bank began to
105. For a discussion of special circumstances involving the borrower's reliance on advice received from the lender, see infra notes 155-184 and accompanying text.
106. For a discussion of special circumstances involving the lender's acquisition of superiority, influence, dominion, or control over the borrower, see infra notes 185-194 and
accompanying text.
107. 498 So.2d 923 (Fla. 1986).
108. Id. at 925.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 924.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
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suspect that Hosner was involved in a check-kiting scheme and began an
internal investigation of his operations. 115 Within a short time the situation had deteriorated to a point where the bank felt it was at risk, and it
thus decided to return
all of Hosner's checks unless drawn against good
12 6
and collected funds.

A short time later, the customer called Hosner who brought the bank
officer into the phone conversation." 7 During that conversation, the customer asked to borrow an additional $90,000 from the bank." s The bank
correctly assumed that this loan was going to be used to fund a further
investment with Hosner, and on that basis approved and processed the
loan. 1 The bank then received its own loan proceeds check from Hosner,
which had been made payable to the bank's customer but was then signed
over to Hosner Enterprises and deposited into that company's checking
account. 120 The check-kiting scheme was confirmed a short time later,
and because of the customer's deposit
with Hosner Enterprises, the bank
2
was able to avoid an $87,000 loss. '

The customer never realized any return on his investment with either
Hosner or Hosner Enterprises and subsequently brought suit against the
bank alleging among other things, a breach of fiduciary duty.' 22 The court
found the bank liable on this theory and noted that a fiduciary relationship will arise from special circumstances
where a bank, having actual knowledge of fraud being perpetrated upon
a customer, enters into a transaction with that customer in furtherance
of the fraud, or where a bank has established a confidential or fiduciary
relationship with a customer ....

Accordingly, we find that where a

bank becomes involved in a transaction with a customer with whom it
has established a relationship of trust and confidence, and it is a transaction from which the bank is likely to benefit at the customers expense, the bank may be found to have assumed a duty to disclose facts
material to the transaction, peculiarly
within its knowledge, and not
2
otherwise available to the customer. '

Similarly, in Central State Stamping Co. v. Terminal Equipment

Co.,"2 4 a prospective purchaser of machinery from Terminal Equipment

Company called Terminal's bank to verify the company's financial condition. 115 The bank indicated that Terminal was undercapitalized but failed
to disclose its prior default on two separate loans from the bank."2 Cen115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 925 (citations omitted).
727 F.2d 1405 (6th Cir. 1984).
Id. at 1406-07.
Id. at 1408.
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tral State subsequently made a down payment on the machinery which
was utilized by Terminal to reduce its debt to the bank.1 27 Terminal subsequently filed bankruptcy and failed to deliver the machines to Central
State. 128 At trial the court held that once the bank officer voluntarily undertook to provide information to the purchaser concerning Terminal's
creditworthiness, he had a duty to disclose the facts concerning its finan29
cial instability.
The process of examining the circumstances of trust and confidence
is again well illustrated in the case of Klein v. First Edina National
Bank. z30 In that case the plaintiff was the customer of a bank who was
employed by another customer of the same bank.' 3 ' The plaintiff's employer applied for a loan from the bank, which was granted, in part because the plaintiff pledged stock which she owned in her own name, on
3 2
behalf of her employer.1
The bank did not inform the plaintiff of the circumstances surrounding the loan, including the employer's loan history. 13 Ultimately the employer defaulted on the loan and the plaintiff lost the stock which she had
pledged as collateral.1 4 She argued at trial that the bank owed her a fiduciary duty, which it breached by failing to disclose the purpose of the loan
as well as other relevant and important background circumstances."35 The
court rejected the plaintiff's argument and held that
[w]hen the bank transacts business with a depositor or other customer,
it has no special duty to counsel the customer and inform him of every
material fact relating to the transaction-including the bank's motive,
if material, for participating in the transaction-unless special circumstances exist, such as where the bank knows or has reason to know that
the customer is placing his trust and confidence in the bank and is relying on the bank so to counsel and inform him.136
Another important case illustrating the special relationship involved in
fiduciary relationships is High v. McLean FinancialCorp."17 In High, the
court explained that "fiduciary relationship" is loosely defined "so that
the relationship may change to fit new circumstances in which a special
relationship of trust may be properly implied."38 In analyzing the case
before it, the High court was true to District of Columbia law which traditionally looked for close relationships which transcend an ordinary business relationship and demand that the parties to the relationship protect
127. Id.

128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.

Id.
Id. at 1409.
196 N.W.2d 619 (Minn. 1972).
Id. at 621.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 621-22.
Id. at 622-23.
Id. at 623.
659 F. Supp. 1561 (D.D.C. 1987) (citation omitted).
Id. at 1568 (citation omitted).
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one another.139
In High, the plaintiffs alleged that a fiduciary duty existed between
themselves as loan applicants and the bank simply by virtue of "their
loan application, processing fees, and defendants' promises to plaintiffs." 140 Accordingly, they claimed that the bank owed them a duty to
process their loan application promptly, accurately inform them of its status, inform them if the decision was to be made by others, and advise
them of any difficulties. 4 1 The court stated that the plaintiff's complaint
sufficiently supported an inference of a fiduciary duty and breach thereof,
thus holding that a fiduciary duty could arise between a loan applicant
and a bank. 42 It was declared to be a legally cognizable claim and could
not be decided as a matter of law, but rather needed to be resolved on the
basis of a full hearing on the facts of the case. Although the court in High
did not go into detail regarding what would constitute the "appropriate
circumstances" necessary to establish a fiduciary relationship, it did conclude that it was "not convinced. . . that a fiduciary duty can never exist
43
between a lender and a loan applicant."'
A number of state courts have also held that a lender owes a fiduciary duty to its borrower due to a perceived relationship of trust and confidence between them. In such circumstance, the perceptions of the
entrustor are the focus of the courts' deliberations. The oft-quoted case of
Barrett v. Bank of America,' 44 dealing with a claim of constructive fraud,
demonstrates this focus. In Barrett, the plaintiffs executed personal guaranties, secured by deeds of trust on parcels of real estate, to support a
loan by the defendant bank to a corporation in which the plaintiffs were
the principal shareholders. 1 45 Within a month after the loan was made,
the bank determined that the company was in technical default of the
loan agreement. 46 The bank's loan officer discussed with the borrower
various methods of improving the company's financial situation. Among
these proposals was a merger whereby the resulting company would be
responsible for the debt and the plaintiffs would be released from their
guaranties and liability. 47 Subsequently, following the bank's advice,
such a merger did in fact take place, the terms of which provided that the
plaintiffs were to be released from the prior guaranties after a period of
six months.'48 However, soon thereafter, the new company filed for bankruptcy protection under chapter 11 and foreclosure proceedings were instituted against the plaintiffs on their guaranties. 49 The plaintiffs,
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.

Id. (citations omitted).
Id. at 1568.
Id.
Id. at 1568-69.
Id. (citation omitted).
229 Cal. Rptr. 16 (Ct. App. 1987).
Id. at 17.
Id. at 17-18.
Id. at 18.
Id.
Id.
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alleging that the bank's loan officer had promised that they would be released from these underlying guaranties if the merger was consummated,
brought suit against the bank for damages for breach of contract, fraud,
constructive fraud, conspiracy to defraud, negligence, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. 150
The issue of liability was then submitted to the jury in a special verdict form. The plaintiffs requested a special instruction on "constructive
fraud," but their request was denied by the court. 15 In the special verdict, the jury found that (1) the bank's employee had made the alleged
promise to release them from their personal guaranties if the merger was
conducted as specified, and (2) that the plaintiffs had reasonably relied
on such promise.' 52 However, the jury also concluded that notwithstanding the foregoing, there was no intent to defraud. 53 The trial judge there
upon entered a verdict for the bank.
On appeal, the California Court of Appeals held that the trial judge
erred in failing to give the requested special instruction on "constructive
fraud." In so finding the court said:
Constructive fraud exists in cases in which conduct, although not actually fraudulent, ought to be so treated-that is, in which such conduct
is a constructive or quasi fraud, having all the actual consequences and
all the legal effects of actual fraud. Constructive fraud usually arises
from a breach of duty where a relation of trust and confidence exists.
Confidential and fiduciary relations are in law, synonymous and may be
said to exist whenever trust and confidence is reposed by one person in
another. The relationship of a bank to depositor is at least quasifiduciary.'"
The Barrettcourt found "substantial evidence" supporting the plaintiffs'
theory of constructive fraud and a fiduciary relationship, such as, (1) the
plaintiffs' perception of a close relationship to the loan officer, (2) the
plaintiffs' implicit reliance on the bank's advice concerning the merger,
(3) the plaintiffs' sharing of confidential financial information with the
bank, and (4) the fact that the bank "stood to benefit from the
merger.' 55 Taken together, the cases discussed in this section illustrate
the willingness of courts to look to the surrounding circumstances of a
bank's conduct with a particular emphasis on the relationship involved in
an effort to determine whether there was the repose of trust and confidence in the bank and whether the bank was aware of such repose and
accepted it. When there is such a repose of trust and confidence in the
lender who then knowingly and willingly accepts it, a relational predicate
is established, giving rise to a fiduciary duty on the part of the bank
which otherwise would not have existed.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152.
153.
154.
155.

Id. at 19.
Id.
Id. at 20 (citations omitted).
Id. at 20-21.
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2. Advice and reliance
The second factor which plays an active role in the formation of a
fiduciary relationship is the advice often given by lenders and the relative
reliance placed on that advice by borrowers. In a recent Alabama case,
one of two partners in a long-standing furniture business sought financing
on his own behalf from the company's bank, in order to fund the buy out
of his partner's interest in the business.15 1 When the departing partner
learned of their bank's involvement he brought suit and urged the court
to recognize a fiduciary relationship between himself and the bank.' The
court rejected the request, holding that although "[a] fiduciary duty may
arise when the customer reposes trust in a bank and relies on the bank
for financial advice, or in other special circumstances"1 8 there were no
allegations in the present case that the plaintiff had either placed trust
and confidence in the bank or that he had relied on the bank officer to
counsel him.1 9
In the case of Stewart v. Phoenix NationalBank,6 0 the court found
that because of a twenty-three-year-old relationship between the lender
and the borrower, the borrower was justified in believing that when the
bank undertook to advise him it would not take financial advantage of
him. 6 ' The bank, however, not only gave the borrower bad advice, but
actually affirmatively misled him. The court held that the allegation that
the bank had served as the borrower's financial advisor for many years,
with corresponding customer reliance, was sufficient to sustain the borrower's claim that a fiduciary duty existed.1 6 2 The court failed, however,
to explain at what point the relationship was actually established.
The Illinois Court of Appeals recently faced the issue of the establishment of fiduciary obligations in the case of Mid-America National
156. Baylor v. Jordan, 445 So. 2d 254, 255 (Ala. 1984).
157. Id. at 256.
158. Id.
159. Id. The court impliedly offered some additional guidance regarding what factors
might constitute a "special relationship or circumstances," stating
[n]or do we opine that other special circumstances exist here which would warrant a fiduciary duty on the part of the bank to disclose. This is not a situation
where a party with superior knowledge acted to the detriment of a party in an
inferior pr-ition. There was no weakness of age, no lack of mental strength and
no absence of business intelligence.
Id.
160. 64 P.2d 101 (Ariz. 1937).
161. Id. at 106.
162. Id. But see Pieper v. Melrose Credit Union, No. C7-92-2474, 1993 Minn. App.
LEXIS 85, at *4 (Jan. 26, 1993) (rejecting a claim of reliance based upon a long-term borrower-lender relationship and holding that although the borrower "stated by affidavit that

he relied on the credit union's advice, there is no claim that the credit union knew or had
reason to know of any special reliance nor factual support for the claim, if made"). See also
Pigg v. Robertson, 549 S.W.2d 597 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977) (ruling in favor of the borrower
based on a finding that the bank knew that it was being called upon to provide advice and
therefore, "could reasonably be expected to know that such reliance was placed in [it]"). Id.

at 601.
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Bank v. First Savings & Loan Association.6 3 Although finding that no
fiduciary relation existed in the case before it, the court concluded that
even in cases where no fiduciary duty was established by strict legal principles, close relationships where one party places great reliance on the
other could give rise to a fiduciary relationship.16 4 In Mid-America, the
borrower brought suit against his mortgage lenders, alleging that they had
breached a duty owed to him because they lent him mortgage funds without informing him that the properties he planned to acquire were located
in a flood hazard area and that there was flood insurance available
6 5
Although the borrower did in fact suffer an uninthrough the lender."
sured flood loss on the acquired properties, he was unable to demonstrate,
notwithstanding his long relationship with the bank, that there was any
attempt on its part to advise him regarding the flood status of the property, and thus he could prove no reliance on his part. 6 The court held
that the bank's silence did not give rise to6 7the type of special circumstances required to create a fiduciary duty.
In other contexts, however, silence on the part of a lender and a borrower's corresponding reliance on that silence has been held to satisfy the
special circumstances requirement. In First National Bank v. Brown,6 8
the bank made a loan to the borrower knowing that the proceeds were
going to be used to purchase an interest in property in which the bank
had a substantial lien interest.' 9 At no time during the negotiation or
consummation of the loan did the bank mention to the borrower its lien
interest in the property.' Additionally, the bank did not inform the borrower that once his loan was funded and he purchased the encumbered
property, it was the bank's intention to apply a substantial portion of it
the borin satisfaction of its preexisting lien.' 7 ' When the bank did 7so,
2
rower brought suit claiming a breach of fiduciary obligation.
In ruling against the bank, the court stated first the basic principle
that "[o]rdinarily mere silence on the part of one party in an arms-length
transaction, as to material facts discoverable by the other does not serve
to create actionable fraud."' 173 The court next explained, however, that
where there exists a relationship of trust or confidence, and the trusted
party has superior knowledge of the facts . . . [t]he superior party has a
duty to disclose all material facts of which he is aware. 1 7 4 The court
found that due to the bank officer's behavior and the actions of the bor163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.

Ct. App. 1987).
515 N.E.2d 176 (Ill.
Id. at 180 (citation omitted).
Id. at 177-78.
Id. at 180-81.
Id. at 181.
181 N.W.2d 178 (Iowa 1970).
Id. at 180.
Id.
Id. at 181.
Id.
Id. at 182.
Id. (citations omitted).
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rower, it was clear that the officer either knew or should have known of
the reliance placed on his trustworthiness. 75 Thus, the court concluded
that "there was imposed upon [the bank] an unfulfilled duty of
disclosure.'

17

In stark contrast to the holding and reasoning in Brown, the court in
the case of Denison State Bank v. Madeira,' rejected the silence-asbreach theory under very similar facts. In that case, just as in Brown, the
undisclosed facts were a matter of public record and were not disclosed
by the lender. 78 When the borrower's fortunes changed for the worse, he
brought suit claiming that the bank owed him a fiduciary duty to disclose
negative information within its knowledge prior to making the loan. 79
The court reasoned that, "[t]he facts which the defendant [borrower]
contends were concealed from him were either a matter of public record
or were otherwise readily available if some reasonable effort had been
made to ascertain them."' 8 0 It then concluded that the borrower must be
responsible for using some diligence to protect himself and could not rely
on the bank to provide information in the public record.' 8 ' The Denison
court was unsympathetic to fiduciary notions and adhered to the traditional adversarial rule for parties to a transaction, noting that the borrower was an experienced businessperson who was "fully competent and
able to protect his own interests."'' Not doubting the borrower's testimony that he had in fact trusted and relied upon the bank, the court
rather regarded that reliance as unreasonable under the circumstances,
presumably because of his experience and sophistication. 8 3 In so ruling,
the court said that as a matter of policy "one may not abandon all caution and responsibility for his own protection and unilaterally impose a
fiduciary relationship on another without a conscious assumption of such
duties by the one sought to be held liable as a fiduciary."'184 The court
explained that the adoption of such a standard would put an intolerable
obligation upon banking institutions and convert ordinary day-to-day
business transactions into fiduciary relationships where none were intended or anticipated."'' 8 5
That Denison, despite its factual similarity to Brown, resulted in a
contrary holding, demonstrates that the element of reliance as an indicia
of a "special circumstance" may in some way interrelate with the third
175. Id. "[T]he record clearly discloses [that the bank's lending officer] so comported
himself that he knew or should have known from the [borrower's] questions and reaction
that the latter trusted him implicitly," and was therefore relying on his trustworthiness.
176. Id.
177. 640 P.2d 1235 (Kan. 1982).
178. Id. at 1239.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 1243.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 1244.
183. Id. at 1243.
184. Id. at 1243-44.
185. Id. at 1243.
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theory under which courts have found that a fiduciary relationship between a borrower and lender may be established-superiority, influence,
dominion, or control of one party over the other.
3. Superiority, influence, dominion or control
The cases in this category are generally consistent with the principle
that when a borrower reposes faith and confidence in her lender it is possible for the normal arm's-length transaction to evolve into one which
places fiduciary duties on the lender. However, the following cases take
that standard further and require that two additional conditions be met.
Not only must the borrower repose such faith and confidence in the
lender but in addition: (1) as a direct and causal consequence, the lender
must thereby acquire dominion, control or influence over the affairs of
the borrower, and (2) the borrower must also be in a position of weakness,
dependence or inequality.
In one such case, Garrett v. Bank West, Inc.,188 the borrower was a
farmer attempting to expand operations to increase production and profitability. 18 7 Garrett, the farmer/borrower, had acquired a loan with a bank
with which he had an ongoing relationship in order to finance the expan' When the borrower encountered financial difficulties in making
sion. "88
loan payments, the bank proposed a schedule of cash flows and a total
payment scheme. 89 The borrower's finances continued their spiral descent, however, unaided by the bank's suggestions. Ultimately, the farm
was lost. 90 Garrett claimed that he and the bank were involved in a fiduciary relationship.' 9 ' The principal consideration of the court in determining the existence of such a relationship was not the "mere rendering
of advice,' ' 9 2 but whether the lender had exerted any control over a weak

and dependent borrower. 9 3 The court explained that while a relationship
between a bank and borrower is generally seen as a debtor-creditor relationship involving no fiduciary duties, "[s]uch a relationship can become
a fiduciary relationship if the borrower reposes a faith, confidence, and
trust in the bank which results in dominion, control or influence over the
borrower's affairs. . . [but] the borrower who reposes the confidence must
be in a position of 'inequality, dependence, weakness or lack of knowledge.' ,,'94 The court in Garrett had no doubt that advice had been rendered and relied upon, but because the borrower was knowledgeable, and
because the lender had not taken decisional or physical control of opera186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.

459 N.W.2d 833 (S.D. 1990).
Id. at 835.
Id. at 836.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 837.
Id. at 838.
Id. at 838-39.
Id. at 838 (quoting Union State Bank v. WoeU, 434 N.W.2d 712, 721 (N.D. 1989)).
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tions, no fiduciary relationship could be established. 195
C. The Lender-Borrower Relationship as Quasi-Fiduciary
1.

The Rise of Commercial Cotton

In 1985 the California Court of Appeals upheld the claims of a commercial depositor against a bank in Commercial Cotton Co. v. United
California Bank,""8 and in so doing advanced a highly controversial and
innovative theory. Analogizing the relationship between a bank and its
depositor with that which exists between an insurer and its insured, the
court held that "[t]he relationship of bank to depositor is at least quasifiduciary. ' 197 In Commercial Cotton, the plaintiff was not a commercial
borrower, but rather a commercial enterprise that maintained an ordinary
checking account with the defendant bank. Upon discovering the loss of a
number of blank checks imprinted with the bank's name and the plaintiff
company's name and account number, the company reported the loss to
the bank.198 Some time later when one of the lost checks in the amount of
$4,000 was presented to the bank with a forged signature, the bank
honored the check despite its prior notice from the company. 99
When the plaintiff discovered the loss and made a demand on the bank
for repayment, the bank denied liability and refused to repay the depositor for the wrongfully paid check. 20 0 In its defense, the bank weakly argued that the depositor had failed to bring its claim before the expiration
of a one-year statute of limitations and was guilty of comparative negligence in losing the checks in the first place.20 In finding for the plaintiff,
the court held that, due to a "quasi-fiduciary duty" of a bank to its depositor, depositors have a right to "reasonably expect a bank not to claim
nonexistent legal defenses to avoid reimbursement when the bank negligently disburses entrusted funds."' 2 The bank's defense on the basis of
the expiration of a one-year statute of limitations was held to be "spurious. . . and the jury found experienced legal counsel interposing them in
an unjustifiable, stonewalling effort to prevent an innocent depositor from
recovering money entrusted to and lost through the bank's own
' 20 3
negligence.
195. Id. at 838-39. Similarly, in Paskas v. Illinois Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 440 N.E.2d
194 (11. Ct. App. 1982), the court found that although there was a reposing of faith and
confidence in the bank, "to the extent that anyone reposes trust and confidence in a commercial bank, there was no resulting superiority and influence on [the bank's] part so as to
create a fiduciary relationship." See also Evra Corp. v. Swiss Bank Corp., 522 F. Supp. 820,
829 (N.D. IMI.1981) (requiring a showing of superiority and influence to establish a fiduciary
relationship between borrower and lender).
196. 209 Cal. Rptr. 551 (Ct. App. 1985).

197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.

Id. at 554.
Id. at 553.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 553-54.
Id. at 554.
Id. The court's conclusion that the bank's defense was spurious was based in
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The essence of the plaintiff's claim in Commercial Cotton was that
the bank's actions constituted a breach of the covenant of good faith and
fair dealing which is implied in every contract.204 On this basis the company sued the bank and received a judgment for $4,000 in compensatory
damages and $100,000 in punitive damages. 205 Because punitive damages
cannot be awarded in an action based only on simple breach of contract,20 6 on appeal the validity of the punitive damage award turned on

the extent to which the underlying cause of action for breach of the cove207
nant of good faith stated a cause of action sounding in tort or contract.
In finding for the plaintiff, the court held that their action sounded
in tort by virtue of a tortious breach of the implied contractual obligation
of good faith and fair dealing. 20 s This decision was premised on two theories: (1) the existence of a special relationship between the bank and its
depositor, and (2) the newly enunciated tort of bad faith defense. 20 9 The
"special relationship" theory was derived from a then-recent California
case which considered the question of a "special relationship" in the context of an insurance contract and had held that this relationship is "characterized by elements of public interest, adhesion, and fiduciary
responsibility.

21 0

In addition, the Commercial Cotton court went on to

large part on the fact that almost two weeks prior to its general counsel sending the plaintiff

a final letter refusing reimbursement, the California Supreme Court had ruled specifically
that a three-year statute of limitations, rather than the claimed one-year statute was applicable to claims such as the one being made by this depositor. Id. at 553 (citing Sun 'n Sand,
Inc. v. United California Bank, 582 P.2d 920 (Cal. 1978)).
204. "Every contract imposes upon each party a duty of good faith and fair dealing in
its performance and its enforcement." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1979).
The claim of a breach of the duty of good faith has been a major source of lender liability
litigation. However, as the term "good faith" is still shrouded in mist and is difficult to
define directly, it has been held that, in essence, it is an "excluder" which is "without general meaning (or meanings) of its own and serves to exclude a wide range of heterogeneous
forms of bad faith. In a particular context the phrase takes on specific meaning, but usually
this is only by way of contrast with the specific form of bad faith actually or hypothetically
ruled out." Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d 373, 399 (Cal. 1988) (quoting Robert S.
Summers, "Good Faith" in General Contract Law and the Sales Provisions of the Uniform
Commercial Code, 54 VA. L. REV. 195, 201 (1968)).
205. Commercial Cotton, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 552.
206. See CAL. CIv. CODE § 3294(a) (Deering 1984) (providing that punitive damages
may be awarded only in "an action for the breach of an obligation not arising from
contract").
207. Commercial Cotton, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 554.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id. (citing Egan v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 620 P.2d 141 (Cal. 1979)). Egan
involved the imposition of tort liability in what ostensibly appeared to be the contractual
context of an insurance agreement. In explaining its rationale for the imposition of tort
liability in that context, the Egan court emphasized the nonprofit objectives of the insured
in seeking protection and peace of mind and the quasi-public and vital nature of the services provided by insurance companies and concluded that the insurance relationship had a
fiduciary quality. Egan, 620 P.2d at 146. For a discussion of commercial bad faith, see C.
Delos Putz, Jr. & Nona Klippen, Commercial Bad Faith: Attorney Fees-Not Tort Liability-Is the Remedy for Stonewalling, 21 U.S.F. L. REV. 419, (1987). See also Careau & Co. v.
Security Pac. Business Credit, Inc., 272 Cal. Rptr. 387 (Ct. App. 1990). The tort of breach of
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note that in another case the California Supreme Court had "found it
unnecessary to determine how far, if at all, the doctrine should extend to
ordinary commercial contracts where parties of 'roughly equal bargaining
power are free to shape the contours of their agreement.'"" Moreover
the California Supreme Court had suggested in dictum that this form of
tort recovery might be appropriate wherever there are, "relationships
the implied covenant of good faith had its origins in the insurance context in Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 426 P.2d 173 (Cal. 1967).
211. Commercial Cotton, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 554 (citing Seaman's Direct Buying Serv.,
Inc. v. Standard Oil Co. of California, Inc., 686 P.2d 1158, 1167 (Cal. 1984). The court in
Seaman's also stated that "[n]o doubt there are other relationships with similar characteristics and deserving of similar legal treatment." Seaman's, 686 P.2d at 1166. However, the
court then cautioned that any consideration of this tort remedy in the "ordinary" commercial context was a move "into largely uncharted and potentially dangerous waters." Id. at
1166-67. It then concluded by noting that, "[t]his is not to say that tort remedies have no
place in such a commercial context." Id. at 1167. This discussion by the Seaman's court was
dictum, however, because the court found it unnecessary to predicate liability in that case
on the breach of the implied covenant. Instead, it identified the new tort of intentional and
bad faith denial of the existence of a contract, and rested its decision upon those shores. Id.
Despite being dictum, the language of Seaman's generated a good deal of interest and comment. One scholar wrote that
[o]nce the concept of good faith and fair dealing was found to be a part of the
insurance contract, it did not take long until attorneys were asserting that such a
covenant must also logically be a part of other types of contracts. Following what
appeared to be the obvious lead of the California Supreme Court, lower courts
began extending the concept of good faith to other types of contracts.
Eric Wright, Introduction to Symposium, Bad Faith and Punitive Damages, 29 SANTA
CLARA L. REv. 546 (1989). Additionally, one federal circuit court noted in a particularly
memorable and scathing analysis of the decision in Seaman's that "[iln inventing the tort of
bad faith denial of a contract [in Seaman's] the California Supreme Court has created a
cause of action so nebulous in outline and so unpredictable in application that it more resembles a brick thrown from a third story window than a rule of law." Old Am., Inc., v.
Microtech Int', Inc., 872 F.2d 312, 315 (9th Cir. 1989). However, dispite the ominous
rumblings in Oki, most courts did not rush to expand the tort "invented" in Seaman's, but
rather took heed of the admonition in that case to "proceed with caution." Seaman's, 686
P.2d at 1167. See, e.g., Rogoff v. Grabowski, 246 Cal. Rptr. 185 (Ct. App. 1988) (citing Commercial Cotton approvingly and then denying extension of the tort by finding that no "special relationship" existed between a limousine company and its customers); Martin v. UHaul Co. of Fresno, 251 Cal. Rptr. 17, 26-28 (Ct. App. 1988) (citing Commercial Cotton with
approval, then denying application of the new tort in the context of a franchise agreement
between franchisor and franchisee); Gomez v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 215 Cal. Rptr. 507,
510-13 (Ct. App. 1985) (citing Commercial Cotton with approval, then denying application
of the tort in the context of a claim by a consumer against an automobile manufacturer);
Quigley v. Pet, Inc., 208 Cal. Rptr. 394, 403 (Ct. App. 1984) (denying application of the new
tort remedy in the context of a contract for hauling walnuts, due to a lack of the elements of
"public interest, adhesion and fiduciary responsibility"). There was a similar pattern in the
federal courts. See Standard Wire & Cable Co. v. Ameritrust Corp., 697 F. Supp 368 (C.D.
Cal. 1988); Elxsi v. Kukje Am. Corp., 672 F. Supp 1294 (N.D. Cal. 1987); Premier Wine &
Spirits v. E. & J. Gallo Winery, 644 F. Supp. 1431 (E.D. Cal. 1986). This tort was extended
from the insurance context to employment contracts in Cleary v. American Airlines, Inc.,
168 Cal. Rptr. 722, 728-29 (Ct. App. 1980). See, e.g., Gray v. Superior Court, 226 Cal. Rptr.
570, 573 (Ct. App. 1986); Khanna v. Microdata Corp., 215 Cal. Rptr. 860, 864 (Ct. App.
1985). Commercial Cotton, however, was the first to extend the tort to the area of banking
law.
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with similar characteristics"2'12 to those of insurer and insured.

On the basis of the decisions in Egan and Seaman's, the court in
Commercial Cotton concluded that
banking and insurance have much in common, both being highly regulated industries, performing vital public services substantially affecting
the public welfare. A depositor in a non interest-bearing checking account, except for state or federal regulatory oversight, is totally dependant on the banking institution to which it entrusts deposited funds
and depends on the bank's honesty and expertise to protect them.21
The decision in Commercial Cotton was cited without criticism in a
number of subsequent California decisions214 and was also expressly followed by the same appellate court in the context of a suit brought not by
a depositor, but by a borrower against a bank. 2 15 In addition, it received
both negative and positive reviews by student commentators and prestigious academics alike. 2 16 Sadly, however, the quasi-fiduciary relationship
212. Seaman's, 686 P.2d at 1166. Following the reasoning in this dictum from Seaman's, a subsequent case found the required similarity of characteristics in the relationship
between employee and employer in the context of an employment severance contract sufficient to create a "special relationship." Wallis v. Superior Court, 207 Cal. Rptr. 123 (Ct.
App. 1984). That case arose in the context of a peremptory termination by an employer of
previously agreed upon termination benefits. Id. at 125. As such, it is part of the wrongful
termination line of cases. In deciding whether a "special relationship" existed sufficient to
support a claim of tortious breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, the
Wallis court emphasized that it was not in the least limited to employment contract concepts, rather, it held that the "similar characteristics" which would signal the existence of a
"special relationship" could be found in almost any "special" kind of commercial contractual relationship. Wallis, 207 Cal. Rptr. at 127. In so doing, the Wallis court identified the
following five (5) part test for identifying the "similar characteristics" necessary for determining the existence of a "special relationship" which must be present to permit the imposition of tort liability in what would otherwise be a simple contracts case: (1) inherently
unequal bargaining positions; (2) non-profit motivation, i.e., objective of securing peace of
mind, security; (3) inadequacy of ordinary contract damages; (4) special vulnerability of one
party to harm as a result of breach of trust of the other; and (5) awareness by the other of
this special vulnerability. Id. at 129. Subsequently, in Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 765
P.2d 373, 396 (Cal. 1988), without directly addressing the decision or the standards set out
in Wallis, the court reversed the earlier line of cases stemming from Cleary v. American
Airlines, Inc., 168 Cal. Rptr. 722 (Ct. App. 1980), and held that there was no justification
either in policy or precedent to justify extending the tort recovery allowed for breach of the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in insurance contracts to employment contracts. Foley, 765 P.2d at 395-96. The court concluded by saying that "[w]e therefore conclude that the employment relationship is not sufficiently similar to that of insurer and
insured to warrant judicial extension of the proposed additional tort remedies" and thereby
affirmed "the traditional separation of tort and contract law." Id. at 396.
213. Commercial Cotton, 209 Cal. Rptr. 551, 554 (Ct. App. 1985).
214. Martin v. U-Haul Co. of Fresno, 251 Cal. Rptr. 17, 26 (Ct. App. 1988); Rogoff v.
Grabowski, 246 Cal. Rptr. 185, 189 (Ct. App. 1988); Multiplex Ins. Agency, Inc. v. California
Life Ins. Co., 235 Cal. Rptr. 12 16-17 (Ct. App. 1988); Gomez v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 215
Cal. Rptr. 507, 510 (Ct. App. 1985).
215. Barrett v. Bank of Am., 229 Cal. Rptr. 16, 20 (Ct. App. 1986). For a general discussion of this case, see supra notes 144-154 and accompanying text.
216. Putz & Klippen, supra note 209, at 462-65, n.178; Kenneth W. Curtis, Comment,
The Fiduciary Controversy:Injection of FiduciaryPrinciplesInto the Bank-Depositor and
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developed in Commercial Cotton was short-lived.
2. The fall of Commercial Cotton
Notwithstanding its initial positive reception, the decision in Commercial Cotton recently has been the focus of considerable judicial criticism2 17 and now actually appears to have been overruled by the same
court that originally decided it in Copesky v. Superior Court.21s In reaching this stunning conclusion, the court in Copesky wrote that, "[a]bsent a
drastic change in the Supreme Court's direction . . . the philosophy and
219
trend of Commercial Cotton might still be healthy."
The Copesky decision should not have come as a complete surprise,
however, as the court had noted the winds of such a "drastic change"
blowing from the California Supreme Court's direction in its decision in
Foley v. Interactive Data Corp.220 In considering the nature of these
winds and their effect on the continued viability of Commercial Cotton,
the Copesky court first engaged in a review of the development of the law
with respect to the tort of breach of the covenant of good faith and fair
dealing, then directly considered the now rather infamous "quasi-fiduciary" standard first enunciated by Commercial Cotton.22 Like Seaman's,
the facts in Foley arose in the context of an employment contract. In
revisiting this issue, the California Supreme Court emphasized the differences between contract and tort remedies and reaffirmed that notwithstanding the exception to the general rule developed in the context of
insurance contracts, only contract remedies should be available for the
breach of implied contractual covenants.22 The court then held that "we
are not convinced that a special relationship analogous to that between
insurer and insured should be deemed to exist in the usual employment
relationship . . . . [T]he need to extend the special relationship model in
Bank-Borrower Relationships, 20 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 795 (1987); N.E. Betsworth Note, Commercial Cotton Co. v. United California Bank: California'sNewest Extension of Bad Faith

Litigation Into Commercial Law, 16 Sw. U. L. REV. 645 (1986).
217. See Price v. Wells Fargo Bank, 261 Cal. Rptr. 735, 738 (Ct. App. 1989) (stating

that the "tort theory in appellants' cause of action for breach of the implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing is based on a recent, and already discredited, precedent: Commercial Cotton Co. v. United California Bank").
218. 280 Cal. Rptr. 338 (Ct. App. 1991). In Copesky, which was decided by the same
court that originally decided Commercial Cotton, albeit with a number of personnel changes

on the bench, the court stated that "we are convinced Commercial Cotton's characterization
of a bank-depositor relationship as quasi-fiduciary is now inappropriate ....
We are therefore forced to acknowledge that our decision in Commercial Cotton, while in its time seemingly in harmony with the direction of the Supreme Court, turned out, after Foley, to be

misdirected." Id. at 348.
219. Id. at 344.
220. 765 P.2d 373 (Cal. 1988). It is noteworthy that the composition of the California
Supreme Court that decided Foley had changed rather substantially from the one that decided Seaman's. Only two of the seven justices that decided Seaman's were still sitting on
the bench when Foley arrived.

221. Copesky, 280 Cal. Rptr. at 342-48.
222. Foley, 765 P.2d at 389-90.
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the form of judicially created relief of the kind sought here is less
' 3
22
compelling.
On the basis of the Foley decision, the Court of Appeals in Copesky
concluded that
[t]here is no question but that the decision in Foley redirects the course
of law in the area of tort recovery for breach of commercial contracts.
While some may argue that the Seaman's tort of bad faith denial of the
existence of a contract remains viable, few would contend that new
broad categories of business relationships remain to be identified by the
Wallis test as presumptively amenable to tort remedies for contact
breach. Before Foley, one could confidently suggest that at least in two
spheres of contract relationships-insurance contracts and employment
agreements-a bad faith breach could give rise to tort damages. That
assumption is now gone; there is only one category of business transactions which definitionally is amenable to tort actions for contract
breaches, and that is insurance. 24
Significantly, the decision in Foley neither specifically referred to
commercial banking activities nor cited Commercial Cotton in text or
footnotes. Despite this apparently deliberate omission, however, the
Copesky court said that it was "most satisfied. . . that if the Foley court
were to apply the same reasoning to the commercial banking business
which it applied to employment contracts it would conclude that, in the
usual case, the 'special relationship' found in insurance cases and evaluated by the Wallis standards would be lacking."22' 5
In support of this conclusion, the Copesky court cited a number of
post-Foley appellate decisions, including Price v. Wells Fargo Bank,226
223. Id. at 395-96.
224. Copesky, 280 Cal Rptr. at 345. However, notwithstanding the decision in Foley,
the five-part test enunciated in Wallis was not rejected and is still good law. The Foley
court took notice of Wallis and its five-part test for a "special relationship" by specifically
citing and making a detailed reference to them, without any express or implied rejection or
departure from such standards, it can be persuasively argued that the Foley court recognized Wallis and its test as established precedent. The Copesky court came to just this
conclusion when it observed that, "[1]acking any suggestion [in Foley] of disapproval, we
conclude that the Wallis factors for determining [a] 'special relationship' remain viable,
even if having perhaps little utility in the ordinary employment relationship." Id. at 345
n.10. Additionally, with regard to the reference in Seaman's that, "[n]o doubt there are
other relationships with similar characteristics and deserving of similar legal treatment," the
majority in Foley explained that, rather than signaling the court's approval of the extension
of tort remedies, "[i]f anything, the reference highlighted the fact that this question remained to be decided by this court." Foley, 765 P.2d at 392.
225. Copesky, 280 Cal. Rptr. at 345.
226. 261 Cal. Rptr. 735 (Ct. App. 1989). Careau & Co. v. Security Pac. Business Credit,
Inc., 272 Cal. Rptr. 387, 403-04 (Ct. App. 1990) (finding no special relationship to exist in
the bank-borrower relationship); Mitsui Mfrs. Bank v. Superior Court, 260 Cal. Rptr. 793
(Ct. App. 1989) (same justice on the court that initially wrote its decision in Commercial
Cotton, stating that "[w]e reject [the] real parties' argument that the tort doctrine which
has been extended only to situations where there are unique fiduciary-like relationships between the parties should encompass normal commercial banking transactions." Id. at 795;
Despite its cited authority, the Copesky court went on to note that the reasoning in Corn-
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and then proceeded to apply each of the Wallis standards to the commercial banking arena on its own accord. With regard to the first of the Wallis standards, "inherently unequal bargaining positions," 22 the Copesky
court found that "ordinarily" a commercial entity and a bank are not in
inherently unequal bargaining positions. 22 s It noted that banks offer a

standard product and operate in a very competitive business climate, and
thus concluded that no "aspect of common banking transactions ... suggests to us that banks in general are, or this bank in particular was, in a
superior bargaining position.

2' 29

Turning to the second of the Wallis standards, "non-profit motivation," or the goal of achieving peace of mind, security,

' 23 0

the Copesky

court quickly dispensed with the issue as it applies to the commercial
banking arena. It observed that, unlike insurance contracts, "loan agreements, which are essentially the buying and selling of money, are highly
profit motivated. ' 23 l The court further noted that, although the security
of an institution is a central factor in choosing a bank, it is hardly an
232
overriding factor as is the case with insurance generally.

Similarly, regarding the third of the Wallis standards, inadequacy of
ordinary contract damages, 2 3 3 the court concluded that any inadequacy

there may be in the banking context had nothing to do with the nature of
the banking relationship. The court observed that to the extent that damages recoverable due to a bank cashing a forged check were insufficient to
cover the losses proximately caused by the bank's action, the typical inadequacy of judicial remedies in commercial contexts was to blame. 234
mercial Cotton "has not been unanimously rejected." Copesky, 280 Cal. Rptr. at 346 n.11.
In that footnote the court pointed out that Justice Johnson, dissenting in Lee v. Bank of
Am., 267 Cal. Rptr. 387 (Ct. App. 1990), "would affirm the continued vitality of Commercial
Cotton. His analysis of the Wallis five points results in the conclusion that they fit the
bank-depositor relationship, thus constituting it as a 'special relationship' appropriate for
utilization of tort claims when the deposit contract is breached. We respectfully disagree
with Justice Johnson's approach." Id.
227. Wallis v. Superior Court, 207 Cal. Rptr. 123, 129 (Ct. App. 1984).
228. Copesky, 280 Cal. Rptr. at 346.
229. Id.
230. Wallis, 207 Cal. Rptr. at 129.
231. Copesky, 280 Cal. Rptr. at 346. The court also drew a distinction here, following
the reasoning in Foley, between the employment and the insurance relation. In the insurance relation, there is, the court observed
a unique economic dilemma faced by the insured whose insurer refuses in bad
faith to pay policy benefits. The insured has lost the very benefit for which he
contracted, and is not in a position to seek alternative relief from competitors.
The employee, however, has not bargained for any similar type of "protection"
and the breach of the employment contract causes damages essentially similar to
those resulting from breaches of other kinds of contractual agreements-such as
the refusal to honor a contract for the supply of goods vital to a small dealer's
business. We conclude that the breach of a banker's agreement with its depositor
similarly results in damage typical to all commercial contracts.
Id. at 347 n.13.
232. See Copesky, 280 Cal. Rptr. at 346.
233. Wallis, 207 Cal. Rptr. at 129.
234. Copesky, 280 Cal. Rptr. at 347. For example, absent a specific contractual clause
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This problem, they noted, constitutes a "defect in our jurisprudential system. '235 The court therefore concluded that "[n]o one . .. involved in
commercial litigation these days can be made completely whole.

'238

In

contrast, the court concluded that the type of losses that Wallis envisioned when it enunciated its third standard were those peculiarly associated with denial of payment of insurance proceeds or ... the peremptory
interruption'23 7 of monthly termination payments to an aged retired
employee.

The fourth and fifth components of the Wallis standards, one party's
special vulnerability to harm as a result of breach of trust of the other,
and awareness by the other of this special vulnerability, 3 s can be accurately characterized as two sides of a single coin. Accordingly, the
Copesky court considered these two standards together. In so doing, the
court sought to distinguish "unusual" banking arrangements from "ordinary" ones. The court described the "unusual banking arrangements" as
consisting of those, "whereby minors or other dependent people specifically inform the bank of their complete dependence upon the liquidity of
their bank account.

' 23 9

In contrast, the court noted that "ordinary"

240
checking accounts are not of this nature.
Having made this distinction clear, the court next turned to the type
of "vulnerability" envisaged by the Wallis court. Its analysis ended with
the conclusion that anyone who loses money as the result of a breach of a
commercial obligation considers himself to be damaged and feels a sense
of vulnerability.241 Like the damages factor, the court considered this
type of vulnerability to be common to all commercial transactions and
not necessarily a function of the nature of the typical bank-depositor relationship. Accordingly, the court concluded that this vulnerability was
too common to be a "special vulnerability" deserving of fiduciary

protections.

242

Although not one of the Wallis criteria, the Copesky court also addressed the issue of "public interest" raised by the court in Commercial
to that effect, the inability to recovery attorney's fees and the practical costs of litigation.
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Wallis, 207 Cal. Rptr. at 129.
239. Copesky, 280 Cap. Rptr. at 347.
240. Id. The court also noted that under the facts of Copesky, the commercial checking account of the plaintiff was "so fluid its owners did not notice the theft of some $32,000
for over a period of 18 months." Id. Apparently, the court concluded from this fact that the
plaintiffs did not have the kind of "complete dependence upon the liquidity of their bank
account" that it considered necessary in order to classify the arrangement as "unusual." Id.
241. Id.
242. Id. However, the court did not give any clues as to what the "sort of vulnerability
envisaged by the Wallis criteria" would be. Rather, it simply concluded by negative inference, that whatever, that "sort" was, the typical relationship between bank and depositor
was so commercially normative that it simply could not be included within ambit of the
fourth or fifth Wallis factors. Id.
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Cotton.24 3 In a strikingly superficial manner, the court concluded that it
found nothing in the status of the banking industry sufficiently important
to the public welfare to trigger any sort of impact on the analysis of
whether a fiduciary relationship exists. 244 In support of this rather sweeping and summary dismissal of the importance of the banking industry to
the welfare of the public interest, the court merely cited a student comment in a law review, which had concluded that it was "absurd" to consider the banking industry to occupy a special or particularly noteworthy
245
position with respect to the public interest.
In considering the disputed phrase from Commercial Cotton that
"[the relationship of bank to depositor is at least quasi-fiduciary,"2 4 the
Copesky court first reviewed the authorities, which had consistently held
that the relationship between a bank and its depositor was not a fiduciary
one, but merely one of debtor to creditor. 247 Presuming that the Commercial Cotton court was likewise aware of this precedent, the Copesky court
then decided that Commercial Cotton surely did not "purport to classify
the relationship actually as 'fiduciary.' "248
Having thus concluded what Commercial Cotton was not purporting
to do, the court then attempted to divine what Commercial Cotton did in
fact mean. In pursuit of this goal, the Copesky court first sought to define
the term "quasi" by turning to its dictionary definition. It found the term
defined as "seeming or seemingly; in the nature of; nearly. ' 249 The court
then noted the demeaning quality of the term "quasi," as identified by
Professor Corbin, who explained that "the term quasi is introduced as a
243. Id. The Copesky court noted that Commercial Cotton did not rely on or even
utilize the Wallis five-part standard. Instead, Commercial Cotton relied on those factors
identified by Egan and Seaman's-public interest, adhesion, and fiduciary responsibility.
Having already addressed and in its view discounted the issue of adhesion, the Copesky
court then turned to a brief discussion of public interest.
244. Copesky v. Superior Court, 280 Cal. Rptr. 338, 347 (Ct. App. 1991).
245.

Id. (citing Kenneth W. Curtis, Comment, Fiduciary Controversy: Injection of Fi-

duciary PrinciplesInto the Bank-Depositor and Bank-Borrower Relationship,20 Loy. L.A.
L. REV. 795, 816-17, 817 (1987). The student author concluded that Commercial Cotton's
concern with the public interests at stake in the banking industry was unfounded and that
its concept of
"affected with the public interest" can be applied to common carriers, theaters,
restaurants, inns/motels, food retailers, garbage collectors, doctors and landlords.
The list is virtually endless. Therefore, it would be absurd to single out banks as
having a "special relationship" with its customers merely because banking is affected with the public interest.
Id. In contrast, the court in Commercial Cotton extended a tort first identified with the
insurance industry into the banking arena based on its conclusion that "banking and insurance have much in common, both being highly regulated industries performing vital public
services substantially affecting the public welfare." Commercial Cotton, 209 Cal. Rptr. at
554.
246. Commercial Cotton, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 554.
247. Copesky, 280 Cal. Rptr. at 347 (citing Lawrence v. Bank of Am., 209 Cal. Rptr.
541, 545 (Ct. App. 1985); Morse v. Crocker Nat'l Bank, 190 Cal. Rptr. 839, 842 (Ct. App.
1985)).
248.

Id. at 348.

249. Id. (citing

BRYAN

A. GARNER, A

DICTIONARY OF MODERN LEGAL USAGE

457 (1987).
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weasel word that sucks all the meaning of the word that follows it.

'25 0

The court then concluded that because of the manner in which the
term "quasi" was employed by Commercial Cotton, and in light of the
fact that there were no citations of authorities supporting its use of the
phrase, "quasi-fiduciary," that Commercial Cotton's use of that phrase
was not meant to question existing authorities regarding the debtor-creditor relationship of banks and depositors. 251 Rather, by using the "quasifiduciary" language, the court in Commercial Cotton was seeking:
only a shorthand phrase to describe attributes in the relationship which
are similar to some of the attributes of a true fiduciary relationship.
The court was, simply, grappling with the criteria described in Egan
and Seaman's ...

for establishing [a] "special relationship," and not-

ing that some contractual features of a banking relationship establish
elements of reliance and trust which "seem like" or are "in25the
nature
2
of" obligations resulting from a true fiduciary relationship.
Although concluding that Commercial Cotton was not attempting to
strike out into new territory when it adopted the phrase "quasi-fiduciary," the Copesky court nevertheless disapproved of its use.2 53 They
based this disapproval on two grounds, (1) that the use of such "loose
characterizations" were both "unhelpful and fraught with analytic pitfalls" and (2) that such characterizations could lead to "importing uncritically the entire cargo of fiduciary obligations into the port of. . . the
ordinary bank-depositor relationship. ' 254 In light of the foregoing reasoning and the decision in Foley, the court distanced itself from Commercial
Cotton by concluding that the term "quasi-fiduciary" is now "inappropriate" and that their own decision in that case "while seemingly in harmony with the direction of the Supreme Court, turned out, after Foley, to
'255
be misdirected.

D. Discrete Aspects of the Bank-Customer Relationship Which Give
Rise to Fiduciary Obligations by their Very Nature
1. Loan processing
Some courts have distinguished between the common component
parts of borrower-lender relationship, recognizing some as having attendant fiduciary duties on the part of the lender while others do not. Although reaffirming the customary understanding that in "most instances
250. Id. (citing ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 19 (1963).
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. Id. at 348 n.14.
254. Id. (citations omitted).
255. Id. at 348. Thereafter, the court acknowledged the accuracy of Price and Careau
as being indicative of the true state of the law in this area, and held that "the ordinary
bank-customer relationship [is] not a special relationship giving rise to tort remedies when
the bank unreasonably, and even in bad faith, denies liability on a contract or interposes
spurious defenses." Id. at 348-49.
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the relationship of a creditor to his debtor [is] governed by the principles
of freedom of contract and [is] not a fiduciary relationship," the Ohio
Supreme Court in Stone v. Davis2 58 nevertheless drew a sharp distinction
in this regard between the negotiation of the terms of the loan and the
bank's processing of the loan once it is in place. 257 In Stone, a young
couple secured a loan from a local bank in order to finance their purchase
of a dairy farm. Shortly thereafter, the farm's cows contracted a reproductive disease and had to be sold, causing the borrowers to fall behind
on their payments to the bank. 25 However, before they could satisfy their
indebtedness, the husband died in a motorcycle accident and the bank
subsequently foreclosed its loan against the young widow in her capacity
as co-debtor.2 59 The trial court found that at the time of the loan the
bank had neither taken any steps to procure mortgage insurance for the
20
borrowers nor advised them that they were to procure it for themselves.
As a result, no mortgage insurance was ever obtained.
Although denying the allegation that it did not advise the borrowers
regarding the need for and the mechanics of obtaining mortgage insurance, the bank insisted that it had no duty to do so because the parties
were in an arm's-length debtor-creditor relationship. 261 In response, the
court held that
while a bank and its customer may be said to stand at arm's-length in
negotiating the terms and conditions of a mortgage loan, it is unrealistic to believe that this equality of position carries over into the area of
loan processing, which customarily includes advising the customer as to
the benefits of procuring mortgage insurance on the property which
262

secures the bank's

loan.

The court based this conclusion on both the individual facts of the
case as well as on broader policy considerations. The court found that
where, as here, there is a young couple, apparently dealing with the complex mortgage process for the first time, it could not be doubted that
their every action was guided by the loan officers of the bank, upon whom
they justifiably relied as experts in the area of loan processing. 263 Moreover, under such circumstances, the court concluded that "both sides to
the loan transaction must have understood that a special trust or confidence had been reposed in [the bank] to advise and assist [the borrowers]
256. 419 N.E.2d 1094 (Ohio), cert. denied, 454 U.S. (1981).
257. Id. at 1097-98. See also Blon v. Bank One, 519 N.E.2d 363 (Ohio 1988) (citing
Stone v. Davis with approval, but distinguishing it on its facts to find in favor of the bank
on a claim of failure to disclose finder's fee by borrower); Logsdon v. Nat'l City Bank, 601
N.E.2d 262, 270 (Ohio C.P. 1991) (finding against the bank on a claim of improper conduct
in connection with the processing of loans with the plaintiffs and citing Stone v. Davis).
258. Id. at 1095-96.
259. Id. at 1096.
260. Id.
261. Id. at 1097.
262. Id. at 1098.
263. Id.
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in procuring the insurance.""
Accordingly, the court held that the bank
both owed and had breached a fiduciary duty to the borrowers. 6 5
Relying on public policy for further support of its conclusions, Stone
noted that its holding was supported by the existence of federal truth in
lending laws. 266 In enacting such legislation the court noted that "Congress implicitly recognized that, in matters integrally related to the complex loan processing procedure utilized in the modern banking system,
the principle of freedom of contract must be aided, the arm's length bargaining assisted, by imposing certain duties of disclosure upon banks" in
order to promote the informed use of credit. 6 7 The court also emphasized
that because mortgage insurance serves to protect the bank's investment
in a loan, the bank does not act as a disinterested advisor, but rather has
a "direct pecuniary interest in inducing [its borrowers] to procure it." 2 8
Similarly, in the recent case of Steelvest, Inc. v. Scansteel Service
Center, Inc.,26 9 the Kentucky Supreme Court noted the traditional view
that the relationship between a bank and depositor is governed by principles of debtor-creditor,2 7 0 but went on to point out that "services to borrowers and pledgors may support a finding that a bank, in taking a
borrower's note and collateral, falls under a fiduciary duty to disclose material facts affecting the loan transaction. '27 1 The implication is that the
duty is much more likely to accrue once negotiation has ended and
processing begun. Other courts have further held that a fiduciary duty
will arise where a borrower or even a loan applicant deposits escrow or
other money with the potential lender 272 These cases support the proposition that different standards of care should be in effect in the different stages of the relationship.

2.

Confidential relationships

It has been consistently held that while the lender-borrower relationship is not per se a fiduciary one, it may become fiduciary if a business of
confidential relationship induces one party to lessen the normal standard
of care and vigilence employed when dealing with a stranger. 7 3 Such con264. Id.
265. Id.
266. Id.
267. Id.
268. Id. The court also noted that this position is even further supported by the fact
that bank will frequently act as collection agents for the mortgage insurance premiums paid
by their borrowers, collecting the required amounts directly from the borrowers as part of
the monthly payment schedule, and "then remitting the collected premiums to the insurance company, receiving in return a percentage commission for this service." Id. at 1098-99.
269. 807 S.W.2d 476 (Ky. 1991).
270. Id. at 485.
271. Id. See also Henkin, Inc. v. Berea Bank & Trust Co., 566 S.W. 2d 420 (Ky. Ct.
App. 1978) (finding that alleged facts were sufficient to establish fiduciary duties in the
processing as opposed to the negotiating of a loan).
272. E.g., High v. McLean Fin. Corp., 659 F. Supp. 1561, 1568 (D.D.C. 1987).
273. See e.g., United Fire & Casualty Co. v. Nissan Motor Corp., 433 P.2d 769, 771
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fidential relationships arise when, "one party has justifiably reposed confidence in another.' 274 Thereafter, the confidential relationship gives rise
to a fiduciary one when "there is a repose of trust by the customer along
or invitation of such trust on the part of the lending
with an acceptance
'27 5
institution.
It has also long been held that "banks present a constant invitation
to intending borrowers, and thus subject themselves to whatever implication or obligation is to be drawn from that fact. ' 276 Consequently, when a
bank, through its loan officer, improperly discloses or otherwise misuses
the information supplied to him in confidence by a borrower or prospective borrower, the bank must be held accountable under an equitable
remedy such as fiduciary duty. In a frequently cited quotation from M.L.
Stewart to this effect, that court wrote:
[i]f a person applies for a loan, and in connection with that application
discloses his purpose to avail of a bargain which he had not as yet
closed by contract, and of which the lender had not previously heard,
the courts, whether of law or equity, would afford some form of adein case the applicant was forestalled in his project by his
quate relief
277
lender.

The Supreme Court of Kentucky recently added to this line of reasoning in the case of Steelvest, Inc., v. Scansteel Service Center, Inc.2 7 8

In that case, a bank which loaned money to a corporation was approached
by a known director and officer of the corporation seeking to obtain a
commercial loan from the bank for his own behalf.27 He disclosed his
intention to use the funds to form a company which would compete with
the borrower corporation.28 0 The bank granted the loan, 282 the new com(Colo. 1967); Dolton v. Capitol Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 642 P.2d 21, 23 (Colo. Ct. App.
1982).
274. Page v. Clark, 592 P.2d 792, 798 (Colo. 1979).
275. Dolton, 642 P.2d at 23. See also Warsofsky v. Sherman, 93 N.E.2d 612 (Mass.
1950) (finding fiduciary duty); Pigg v. Robertson, 549 S.W.2d 597 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977) (finding fiduciary duty); M.L. Stewart & Co., v. Marcus, 207 N.Y.S. 685 (Sup. Ct. 1924) (finding
fiduciary duty). In each of these cases the borrower, or prospective borrower went to the
bank seeking funds with which to purchase certain property. In connection therewith, they
disclosed the details surrounding the property they were seeking to a loan officer who was
previously unaware of its availability. Thereafter, the loan officers, on the basis of the information supplied to them by the borrower or prospective borrower, purchased the property
which the customer was seeking to buy for their own account. In each case the courts held
that the loan officer had acquired a fiduciary duty by virtue of receiving the confidential
information regarding the available property and breached that duty by purchasing the
property on his own account to the detriment of the customer who had supplied that information under circumstances that justifiably suggested a confidential relationship.
276. M.L. Stewart, 207 N.Y.S. at 692.
277. Id.
278. 807 S.W.2d 476 (Ky. 1991).
279. Id. at 485.
280. Id.
281. Id.

HeinOnline -- 29 Wake Forest L. Rev. 762 1994

BANKING LAW

1994]

pany successfully competed, 2 2 and the old company was forced into
bankruptcy, partially due to the increased competition from the new
company. 8 3

The borrower company sued the former officer for breach of his fiduciary duty and also sued the bank as an aider and abettor.28 4 In reversing

the summary judgment that had been granted in favor of the bank below,
the Kentucky Supreme Court observed that by lending funds to a potential competitor of one of its borrower customers with the knowledge that
this could be detrimental to the client, the bank may have breached a
fiduciary duty.2 85 Moreover, the court found that the lender might have
improperly used information gained from the original borrower in the
26
processing of the loan to the would-be competitor.

Steelvest thus reaffirms the long line of cases holding that where
lenders acquire confidential information from a borrower in the process of

granting a commercial loan, they may thereby acquire a fiduciary obligation to that borrower with respect to that information. Under Steelvest,

this reasoning is extended to the point where the lender may not with
impunity turn around and use that very information as part of its deci-

sional base in order to grant a loan to a competing enterprise. 8 7
Ill.

A CRITIQUE OF THE LAW

A. Definitional Deficiency

Like Lord Chelmsford

ss

before them, most courts that have consid-

ered a fiduciary claim have begun with an attempt to define the phrase
282. Id. at 479.
283.

Id.

284. Id. The Steelvest court noted that "it has been held that a person who knowingly
joins with or aids and abets a fiduciary in an enterprise constituting a breach of the fiduciary relationship becomes jointly and severally liable with the fiduciary for any profits that
may accrue." Id. at 485. See also Jackson v. Smith, 254 U.S. 586 (1921) (holding that a
receiver violates his fiduciary duty when he places himself in a position in which his personal interests may be in conflict with those of his trust); Irving Trust Co. v. Deutsch, 73
F.2d 121 (2d Cir. 1934) (reaffirming the equitable rule that fiduciaries may not assume positions in which their individual interests might conflict with those to whom they owe a duty
of trust).
285. Steelvest, 807 S.W.2d at 486.
286. Id.
237. Id. Expectedly, the bank argued that such a rule would have a chilling effect, and
present an unreasonable imposition upon lending institutions and thereby "preclude the
making of commercial loans to competitors" of existing borrowers. Id. The court dismissed
this fear as "paint[ing] . . . with too broad a brush" partly because any fiduciary duty that
arose in such a context could be easily discharged by the bank by simply disclosing the
information to the existing borrower. Id. It is not per se the bank's actions which constitute
a breach of its fiduciary duty in this regard, but rather, its silence, its passivity in taking no
action. The fiduciary obligation which arises in the context of the inviting, imparting and
reception of confidential information, is first, a duty not to compete, and second a duty to
disclose material information. Id.
288. Tate v. Williamson, 2 Ch. 55 (1866).
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"fiduciary duty."2 ' With disappointing consistency, most of those courts
have invoked strikingly similar language in defining the phrase. Many
have done so in such lockstep fashion that they continually cite other
such judicial attempts as authority for the accuracy of the definition that
they employ in the case at issue.
The problem with this judicially self-dependent definitional process
noted, rather than truly defining the phrase, they
is, as one scholar 2has
"merely describe 9 0 the kind of situations in which the duty has been
found to exist in the past. In so doing, the courts then examine existing
prototypes of fiduciary obligations, such as agency, bailment, and trusts
and seek to import those concepts into the case at hand either by way of
analogy or by use of metaphor. 291 These analogies are frequently inconsisinappropriate; such as analogies
tently applied and are often simply
292
based on notions of contract law.
A more useful apd ultimately more enlightened approach to dealing
with questions of fiduciary obligation would be to begin with an understanding of its historical nature, development, and functional policy goals.
From there a court could decide, not whether the current situation looks
like one in which a fiduciary obligation has been imposed in the past, but
rather, given the issues and positions of the relevant parties, whether that
situation is consistent with the historical equitable foundations of the obligation and the current policy goals underlying the judicial policing of
289. See, e.g., M.L. Stewart & Co. v. Marcus, 207 N.Y.S. 685, 688-91 (Sup. Ct. 1924);
Miller v. U.S. Bank, 865 P.2d 536 (Wash. Ct. App. 1994); Tokarz v. Frontier Fed. Say. &
Loan Ass'n, 656 P.2d 1089, 1092 (Wash. Ct. App. 1982).
290. Frankel, supra note 28, at 805.
291. DeMott, supra note 29 at 880. In this context, the term "metaphor" is defined as
the process of treating two or more dissimilar things in similar fashion in order to draw
upon or highlight their functional similarities. Id. at 880 & n.3. See also Frankel, supra note
28, at 806.
292. See DeMott, supra note 29, at 891 where the author points out that
the metaphorical use of technical legal terms, like "contract" or "agency"..
has even less to commend it in legal contexts where the potential for confusion is
so great. Even if we were persuaded by philosophical arguments that, at some
level, all language is rooted in metaphorical origins, ultimately traceable to essential equations between verbal symbols and nonverbal phenomena, we should
still be disinclined to excuse the metaphoric use of technical terms in workaday
contexts like law. As C.S. Lewis wrote, "That metaphors misread as statements
of fact, are the source of monstrous errors, need hardly be pointed out." . . .
The evolution of the law of fiduciary obligation illustrates, perhaps more
powerfully than most bodies of law, the power of analogy in legal argumentation.
Courts considering whether to impose a fiduciary constraint in a novel context
rely heavily on comparisons to more conventional contexts in which the constraint does apply. Although some commentators find this pattern intellectually
unsatisfying, its pervasiveness and persistence suggest that it is an inevitable
ppect of fiduciary analysis.
Id. (citing C.S. Lewis, Bluspels and Flalansferes,in THE IMPORTANCE OF LANGUAGE 36 (M.
Black ed. 1962)). See also J.C. SHEPERD, LAW OF FIDUcIARiES 5 (1981) (discussing the historical anomalies on which the modem law of fiduciaries is based); Frankel, supra note 28, at
807 (noting that "mechanical analogies to the features of prototypical fiduciary relations
result in rules that are confusing and inappropriate").
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the relationship involved.
In this way, the organic integrity of the law would be preserved and
the application of fiduciary obligation would be allowed to advance into
new situations where it could serve dual policy goals, protect the freedom
of parties to contract as they wish, and at the same time deter creative
opportunistic behavior 2 13 that seeks to take unbargained for advantage of
opportunities which appear on the outer limits of the current legal regime. This approach is particularly appropriate, where, as Professor Frankel has pointed out, our society is witnessing an unprecedented expansion
of interdependence, where freedom from unbargained for coercion has resulted in a society "based predominantly on fiduciary relations."2 94
B.

Failure of Purpose

Another problem apparent in the judicial consideration of fiduciary
obligation claims is their consistent failure to adequately consider the
purposes of the obligation. As indicated in Section II(D),295 from an economic point of view, one of the most significant purposes of the fiduciary
obligation in commercial relationships is the reduction of transaction
costs. Because of the unanticipated wealth transfer inherent in opportunistic behavior, the party that is most vulnerable to such opportunism
will seek the least costly method of self-protection available in order to
deter such behavior. Fiduciary obligation is one of the least costly selfprotection regimes available, and such costs do not necessarily increase
where the parties have explicitly negotiated for such protection rather
than where they operate within a context where the law supplies the obli29 6
gation as a default rule.
It is important to note that vulnerability to opportunism is not necessarily a function of a lack of bargaining power or an undersupply of
commercial sophistication. Rather it is more typically a function of the
relational contracting context itself, where the complexities and potential
range of contingencies for misbehavior 297 by either or both parties are
293. Opportunistic behavior is best understood as "when a performing party [to a contract] behaves contrary to the other party's understanding of their contract, but not necessarily contrary to the agreement's explicit terms, leading to a transfer of wealth from the
other party to the performer." Timothy J. Muris, OpportunisticBehavior and the Law of
Contract, 65 MINN. L. RaV. 521, 521 (1981); See OLIvER E. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS AND ANTI-TRUST IMPLICATIONS (1975); Benjamin Klein, Transaction Cost
Determinants of "Unfair" ContractualArrangements, 70 ANI. ECON. REV., (May 1980) at
356; Oliver E. Williamson, Transaction Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual
Relations, 22 J.L. & EcoN. 233 (1979). Hereinafter, such conduct shall be referred to simply
as "Opportunistic Behavior."
294. Frankel, supra note 28, at 798.
295. See supra notes 256-287 and accompanying text.
296. For an expanded discussion of the "relational contract," see supra note 70.
297. See Fischel supra note 1, at 135-40. Professor Fischel provides an extended discussion of the opportunities for and the problems associated with misbehavior by both
lender and borrower, then demonstates how this reciprocal concern leads both parties to
enter into various kinds of monitoring and bonding mechanisms which, while extremely
beneficial to both parties, do not operate costlessly. Id.
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simply too great to justify the time and expense that would be required
ex ante, to expressly provide for them all by contract. The fiduciary obligation is particularly well suited to this situation, because the vulnerability of the entrustor to misbehavior by the fiduciary is likewise not the
result of an inequality in bargaining power or sophistication. Rather, it
stems from the very nature of the fiduciary relation. The delegated power
to the fiduciary is a double-edged sword which enables him to both benefit and injure the entrustor because "the purpose for which the fiduciary
is allowed to use his powers is narrower than the purposes for which he is
capable of using the power. '' 2 9 8.

However, the judicial decisions where borrowers have claimed the existence and breach of a fiduciary duty frequently cite the relative sophistication and expertise of the borrower as a justification for rejecting the
recognition of such an obligation by the lender. 29 9 Similarly, the courts
often cite the lack of sophistication and expertise of the borrower in recognizing such an obligation by the lender.300 Obviously, a more thorough
examination by these courts of the nature of the fiduciary obligation and
the important purposes it serves in terms of both bonding and monitoring, would be helpful in determining the "relevance" of the parties' relative sophistication and bargaining power before mechanically rejecting
one characterization and allowing another, simply on the basis of relative
sophistication. However, not only do the courts conspicuously fail to engage in any such analytical examination of the relevance of sophistication
in these cases, but they also appear completely unaware that it might
even be an issue.30 ' As a direct consequence, the courts tend to "simply
eviscerate, 2 bonding mechanisms that benefit both borrowers and
lenders.'

While the courts may be blind to the benefits of such a relationship,
the parties surely are not. Because the desire to economize on transaction
298. Frankel, supra note 28, at 810.
299. See, e.g., Denison State Bank v. Madeira, 640 P.2d 1235, 1244 (Kan. 1982).
300. See, e.g., Stone v. Davis, 419 N.E.2d 1094, 1098 (Ohio), cert. denied 454 U.S. 1081
(1981).
301. For example, an attorney clearly owes a fiduciary obligation to his client. However, if that client also happens to be an attorney, with an equal degree of sophistication
and expertise, the fiduciary duty owed to him is not otherwise negatively affected by these
qualities in the client. Similarly, where the trustee of a trust, who clearly owes a fiduciary
duty to the trust's beneficiary, finds that the beneficiary is as skilled and experienced a
financial expert as himself, his fiduciary obligations are not otherwise negatively affected by
those qualities in the beneficiary. One can easily imagine countless similar examples. The
point, however, is that in the typical and traditional fiduciary relationship, the expertise,
sophistication, and experience of the beneficiary or entrustor is never considered as a justifi-

cation for rejecting the recognition of a fiduciary duty. The duty exists in those circumstances by virtue of the nature of the relationship and the position of the parties, regardless
of their relative sophistication or expertise. It is only when the question of a fiduciary duty
is raised in the context of the relationship between a bank and its customer that the relative
sophistication of the parties is raised as a justification for rejecting the recognition of such
an obligation.

302.

Fischel, supra note 1, at 146.
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costs is, in fact, reciprocal, both the lender and the borrower are motivated to create a relationship that has a mix of both monitoring and
bonding arrangements. 3" In this way, both parties can have some security
that misbehavior by the other will be either deterred or adequately compensable if it occurs. Consequently, notwithstanding their written loan
documents, both lender and borrower operate within the context of an
extremely interactive relationship where many of the actual terms that
control the day to day performance of the loan are in the form of agreements between the parties which are not reduced to writing, and in fact
are often at odds with the express terms of the loan documents. These
agreements frequently involve granting the borrower additional flexibility
in performing and the lender additional discretion in evaluating that performance. 04 These agreements work well as long as the loan is performing; however, when a borrower runs into trouble, the lender is then placed
in the moral dilemma of either denying that the oral agreements were
made, or citing the parol evidence rule to exclude their enforceability,
thus returning to the express terms of the loan documents to control the
3 05
terms of the relationship.
The fact that the lender has recourse to the parol evidence rule in
order to deny liability for any oral promises or agreements reached with
the borrower which are contrary to the terms of their written agreement
provides fertile ground for opportunistic behavior on the part of the
lender. This is not to suggest that there may not be many occasions for a
lender to properly invoke the rule. When evaluating a claim by a borrower that such oral promises were made, however, a court should carefully consider the bonding context of the relationship in which such
promises are both normative and beneficial to both parties. In short, for a
court to insist that any and all terms which control the borrowing relationship must be reduced to writing, even where the written loan documents expressly require it, is to ignore the relational context of the
lender-borrower relationship. In that context, such a written reduction is
frequently not done because the advantages of doing so are far outweighed by the economizing and bonding advantages of doing precisely
the opposite. A deeper analysis which recognizes this relational and economic reality is necessary but, all too often, it is completely absent in
judicial opinions considering claims of breach of fiduciary duty in the
lender-borrower context.
303. See Michael C. Jensen and William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. EcoN. 305, 308 (1976).
304. Such agreements are precisely the type of bonding arrangements that parties to a
relational contract seek to create and are, therefore, beneficial to both lender and borrower.
See Fischel, supra note 1 at 143.
305. See, e.g., Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Sav. Ass'n v. Pendergrass, 48 P.2d 659, 661
(Cal. 1935); Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Sav. Ass'n v. Lamb Fin. Co., 3 Cal. Rptr. 877, 880
(Ct. App. 1960).
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C. Special Relationship Problems
As the court in Reid v. Key Bank of Southern Maine, Inc.308 pointed
out, only a small number of jurisdictions today hold that a bank cannot,
under any circumstances owe a fiduciary duty to a customer.307 A sweeping prohibition based on the projected disruption of "a whole system of
credit that exists in the economic marketplace of this country"308 is simply too rigid and narrow to account for the economic and commercial realities of how banks and their customers actually interact in the conduct
of ordinary business transactions. Thus, the question is more accurately
characterized, not as whether a fiduciary obligation can exist between a
bank and its customer, but rather when and under what conditions such
an obligation arises.
Although the jurisdictions are clearly split on this issue,30 the overwhelming majority favor the recognition or imposition of such a duty, but
only in those instances where the customer reposes trust and confidence
in the bank and the bank knowingly and willingly accepts it, or in what
has been variously described as "special circumstances." s10 These "special
circumstances," as was previously discussed, have been loosely grouped
into three general categories: (1) where the borrower reposes special trust
and confidence in the lender; (2) where the borrower receives and relies
on advice given by the lender; and (3) where the lender gains superiority,
influence, dominion, and control over the borrower.311 The quest to define
and identify the "special circumstances" which give rise to a fiduciary
obligation from a bank to its customer has become somewhat akin to a
judicial search for the holy grail. The judicial struggle has occupied a
great deal of time and energy in courts at every level and in every state
and jurisdiction.
The results, however, are far from encouraging. The decisions are not
only confusing, but are often inconsistent and utterly lacking in analytical
depth. For example, some require simply a reposing of a "special trust
and confidence" by the customer in the bank;3 12 others require that such
special trust and confidence must also lead to the bank actually giving the
customer advice, upon which he relies to his detriment; 13 others require
such reliance to be reasonable; 314 and still others require that such reliance on advice must result in the bank thereby acquiring control and do306.

821 F.2d 9 (1st Cir. 1987).

307. Id. at 17.
308.
309.

Id. (quoting from the district court opinion).
For a detailed discussion and review of case law pertaining to the various require-

ments for the establishment of fiduciary duties, see supra notes 96-194 and accompanying
text.
310. Reid, 821 F.2d at 17.
311. For a detailed discussion of the categories of "special circumstances," see supra
Section II (B) (1), (2) and (3).
312. See, e.g., Central State Stamping Co. v. Terminal Equip. Co., 727 F.2d 1405 (6th
Cir. 1984); Barnett Bank v. Hooper, 498 So. 2d 923 (Fla. 1986).
313. See, e.g., Barrett v. Bank of Am., 229 Cal. Rptr. 16 (Ct. App. 1987).
314. See, e.g., Stewart v. Phoenix Nat'l Bank, 64 P.2d 101 (Ariz. 1937).
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minion over the borrower and that such control and dominion be the
result of a weakness, mental infirmity, or other disability on the part of
the customer. 15 These decisions have led to massive confusion and a notable lack of certainty and guidance to banks and customers alike on how
they should conduct themselves in their dealings with one another, and to
the courts that are called upon to police their relationship. Such pervasive uncertainty may actually encourage expensive litigation, thereby raising the costs of transactions for all parties concerned and discouraging
lenders and borrowers from engaging in the very type of bonding and
monitoring activities designed to lower costs. This could in turn result in
increased costs ultimately to be borne by borrowers as the banks pass
them along. In the end, there exists the situation where the borrower,
who often is the least able to control such cost increases and the least
able to bear them, would most often be required to bear the costs. This
situation cannot help but drive many borrowers out of the borrowing
market, deter others from entering, and consequently reduce the demand
and the availability of funds for starting, improving and expanding business enterprises.
In an interesting juxtaposition, a careful review of Commercial Cotton and the controversy it spawned, including the decision in Copesky,
which overruled it, reveals that Commercial Cotton was actually just another chapter in the "hunt for special circumstances," albeit from a fresh
perspective entirely. While many courts were searching for some definitive account of what special circumstances justified the imposition of fiduciary duties on lenders, Commercial Cotton was searching for some
relationship between a bank and its customer that would permit characterizing it as a "special relationship" sufficient to justify the imposition of
the new tort of breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, in
order to expand the range of damages from simple contract to those traditionally found in the tort context. Commercial Cotton found this "special relationship" in what it regarded as the "quasi-fiduciary" relationship
between a bank and its customer. 16 Thus, Commercial Cotton could be
accurately read as having characterized the entire relationship between a
3' 17
bank and its customers as a "special relationship."
Although Commercial Cotton's "quasi-fiduciary" characterization of
the bank-customer relationship has now been overruled by the decision in
Copesky, it would be inaccurate to conclude from this that the search for
the elusive "special relationship" is now at an end. Quite the contrary, in
fact, because the Copesky court specifically noted that depending on the
circumstances, such "special relationships" were still quite possible, notwithstanding its holding, in both the bank-customer relationship gener315. See, e.g., Paskas v. Illinois Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 440 N.E.2d 194 (Ill.
App.
1939); Mash v. Cutler, 488 N.W.2d 642 (S.D. 1992).
316. Commercial Cotton Co. v. United California Bank, 209 Cal. Rptr. 551, 554 (Ct.
App. 1985).
317. Id.
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ally and in the bank-borrower relationship 18 specifically. Unfortunately,
the court gave virtually no guidance whatsoever regarding either what

those circumstances would consist of or how we might recognize them
when we see them.3 19 Therefore, even after the decision in Copesky, we

are no closer to the elusive holy grail than before, with respect to what
elements will consistently and predictably give rise to a fiduciary obligation by virtue of a "special relationship" in either a bank-depositor or a
bank-borrower relationship other than when the bank specifically undertakes such responsibility in a written contract.
D. Reasonable Expectations

As one scholar has noted, "[o]ptimal fiduciary rules approximate the
bargain that the parties would have reached if the costs of contracting
were zero." 320 Thus, there are a range of reasonable and foreseeable ex-

pectations that every commercial borrower has regarding the conduct of
his lender that are never reduced to writing due to the high transaction
costs associated with the effort. An additional reason for not reducing
such expectations to writing, is a result of what may be termed, by analogy, to section 2-615 of the Uniform Commercial Code, the "assumptive
base" of the parties' contract.
Section 2-615 of the U.C.C. is entitled "Excuse by the Failure of Presupposed Conditions" and provides that a party is excused from performance of an otherwise contractual duty on the basis of the occurrence of a
contingency, "the non-occurrence of which was a basic assumption on
which the contract was made. '321 Those elements that comprise the "as318. See Copesky v. Superior Court, 280 Cal. Rptr. 338, 346 n.12 (Ct. App. 1991). The
court said:
We of course are not saying that a bank may not under special circumstances
undertake obligations which bring it into a "special relationship" with a customer ... We refer in our text, supra, simply to the ordinary bank-depositor
relationship (and presumably, although it would be dictum, also to the ordinary
bank-borrower relationship).
Id.
319. The court did note, although quite unhelpfully, that "[m]any banks affirmatively
offer trust and other specifically fiduciary services." Id. Such insight is particulary unhelpful
because it merly recognizes the obvious, i.e. that where a bank specifically and by written
contract undertakes to offer trust and/or fiduciary services, it will be held to the fiduciary
duties of a trustee. Such cases reach litigation only with regard to whether the bank fulfilled
its fiduciary reponsibilities in the conduct of performing it duties. They, of course, never
raise a question as to whether the bank had a fiduciary reponsibility since that issue is
dispositively resolved by the parties' written contract.
320. Fischel, supra note 1, at 147 (footnote omitted). As noted earlier, such contracting costs are not zero and the parties to a loan transaction adopt numerous approaches
in order to seek the protections afforded by high transaction cost negotiation while trying to
reduce the costs of such devices; always mindful, of course, that such costs cannot be reduced to zero.
321. See U.C.C. § 2-615(a) (1989). The test for excuse under this section is based on
the familiar concept of "commercial impracticability," as oppo ,- d to such former characterizations as "impossibility," "frustration of purpose," or "frustration of the venture," in order
to "call attention to the commercial character of the criterion." Id. cmt. 3. Article 2 of the
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sumptive base" of the parties' contract are distinguished from the category consisting of the range of implicit and explicit allocated risks
between them. Events and contingencies which constitute the assumptive
base in the lender-borrower relationship, like any other, are not reduced
to writing because there is such a shared assumption between the parties
regarding their non-occurrence that it is mutually regarded as a poor investment in transaction costs to negotiate and memorialize the obvious.
An excellent example of such an obvious "assumptive base" in the
lender-borrower relationship (as well as the bank-customer relationship
in general) is that the bank will not steal or otherwise misappropriate the
money which the depositor entrusts to the bank out of his own pocket,
and which the borrower entrusts to the bank out of the proceeds of the
loan. Similarly, as seen in the decisions in M.L. Stewart,3 2 Piggs23 and
their progeny, there is also the assumptive base that the bank will not use
the very information which the borrower provides to the bank in confidence in order to secure a loan to compete with the borrower for the same
investment opportunity for which the funds are sought. In the cases that
have dealt with such conduct by the lender, the plaintiffs have uniformly
been successful where they have been able to demonstrate that the information was provided in confidence, and that the bank was unaware of the
opportunity but for the information supplied by the borrower. 24 Not surprisingly, the basis of the lender's liability in such cases has been a breach
of fiduciary duty.
Code applies only to the "sale of goods." Id. § 2-102. However, it can be applied to the
lender-borrower relationship from any one or more of three different perspectives: (1) by
analogizing the underlying purposes and policies behind the rules pertaining to both types
of transactions (The U.C.C. provides that it should be "liberally construed and applied to
promote its underlying purposes and policies" § 1-102(1)); or (2) by characterizing their
relationship as a "mix" of a transaction involving both goods and services; or (3) by characterizing the borrowered funds in a loan transaction as "goods" in and of themselves. There
is particular support for this third alternative in the Code itself. Section 2-105 defines
"goods" as "all things ... which are movable at the time of identification to the contract
for sale other than the money in which the price is to be paid." Moreover, comment one of
that section explains that, "[tihe exclusion of "money in which the price is to be paid" from
the definition of goods does not mean that foreign currency which is included in the definition of money may not be the subject matter of a sales transaction. Goods is intended to
cover the sale of money when money is being treated as a commodity but not to include it
when money is the medium of payment." § 2-105 cmt. 1. Accordingly, to the extent that a
commercial loan transaction can be characterized as the "sale of money" as a "commodity"
where the interest charges and other fees, are nothing more than the long term financing
costs of such a sale, such a transaction falls squarely within the Code's definition of a transaction in "goods."
322. For a discussion of M.L. Stewart & Co. v. Marcus, 207 N.Y.S. 685 (Sup. Ct. 1924),
see supra notes 44-64 and accompanying text.
323. Pigg v. Robertson, 549 S.W.2d 597 (Mo. Ct. App. 1971). For a brief discussion of
this case, see supra note 162.
324. See Pigg, 549 S.W.2d at 601. See also M.L. Stewart & Co., 207 N.Y.S. at 692
(stating that "if a person applies for a loan, and in connection with that application discloses his purpose to avail of a bargain which he had not as yet closed by contract, and of
which the lender had not previously heard, the courts ... would afford some form of adequate relief").
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However, the range of confidential information a borrower provides
to a lender from which the lender could potentially profit is not limited
simply to investment opportunities. Typically, a borrower or prospective
borrower will provide a lender with a great deal of confidential, personal,
and even proprietary information, both in meeting the lender's demands
for information upon which to determine approval of the loan in the first
instance, and subsequent to that approval, on a periodic basis during the
process of servicing the loan in order to monitor the borrower's performance with the terms of the loan agreement. As seen in the case of Steelvest,3 25 a lender may acquire and breach a fiduciary duty to its borrower,
when it uses confidential information obtained from the borrower, to
which it would otherwise not have access, in order to make a lending deciborrower is,
sion regarding another borrower, especially where the second
32
or will be in direct competition with the first borrower.
That such conduct by the lender is violative of the parties' assumptive base can hardly be doubted. For example, suppose that at the time of
the loan application the lender provided the following written disclaimer:
We hereby make no representation or warranty that any funds deposited or otherwise entrusted to the Bank, whether belonging to the borrower or direct loan proceeds hereunder, will not be stolen or otherwise
misappropriated by the Bank, and further, that any information supplied by the borrower, either pursuant to this application or subsequent
thereto, which may be of a confidential, personal, or proprietary nature,
will not be used by the Bank either to compete directly against the
borrower for an investment opportunity or to provide funds to a competitor of the borrower, which funds might otherwise not have been
provided. Borrower hereby consents to and waives any and all claims
against the Bank on the basis of any of the aforesaid conduct by the
Bank.
If this, or any similar type of language appeared in any bank's proposed
loan agreement, that bank would be hard pressed to find any borrowers
willing to accept such outrageous terms.
Accordingly, the absence of this type of language from the parties'
written agreement does not indicate that they have agreed to allow such
conduct by the bank, but rather it suggests that it is so far beyond both
parties' reasonable and foreseeable expectations, that the assumptive base
of their contract includes an expectation that such conduct is prohibited.
At the very least, it is a part of the borrower's assumptive base. A reasonable lender is either actually aware of this expectation or reasonably
should be, and thus is chargeable with either actual or constructive
knowledge of it. It would, therefore, be both anomalous and disingenuous
for a lender to argue that such conduct was within its permissible range
of action, merely because it was not expressly forbidden by the parties'
written agreement.
325.
326.

Steelvest, Inc. v. Scansteel Serv. Ctr., Inc., 807 N.W.2d 476, 486 (Ky. 1991).
Id. at 485.
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Similarly, part of the assumptive base in the lender-borrower relationship includes the concept of competency and mutual good faith. In
fact, section 2-615 of the U.C.C. specifically refers to the concept of good
faith as an overall interpretive
tool to be employed in resolving claims of
'32 7
"presupposed conditions.

Accordingly, borrowers are justified in their

expectation that commercial banks that invite their loan business are implicitly representing that they are competent to underwrite, process and
service such business, that they will employ such expertise in the conduct
of their business, and that they will, at the very least, attempt to respond
honestly when problems arise regarding the bank's conduct. It follows
from this that when problems do arise the bank will not "unreasonably
and even in bad faith, deny liability. . . or [knowingly] interpose spuri28
ous defenses.

3'

A borrower's vulnerability to coercion and opportunism by a lender
in the process of negotiating a loan agreement may be a function of the
borrower's sophistication, experience and access to independent legal
counsel, and thus an inherent risk of contracting. However, the same cannot be said regarding the processing and servicing phases of their relationship. During this phase, a borrower's vulnerability to coercive,
opportunistic and incompetent behavior by its lender is not an aspect of a
special relationship between them, nor of the power and resources of the
borrower, but rather, it is an inherent aspect of the lender-borrower relationship itself.
The vulnerability of the borrower is a normative function of the
lender-borrower relationship, not a special one. It should accrue regardless of the borrower's power, sophistication, or access to independent
counsel. No borrower can efficiently monitor a lender's competency, good
faith, or opportunism in the processing and servicing of its loan (or deposit account for that matter). As a result, any incompetence, bad faith,
or opportunism by the lender only becomes apparent after the fact, once
the damage is done. Such damage is all too frequently unamenable to
valuation in terms of money damages. Some examples include the usurpation of a corporate opportunity and the funding of a direct market competitor on the basis of confidentially supplied and otherwise unavailable
327. See U.C.C. § 2-615 cmts. 5-6 (1989). "The flexible adjustment machinery of this
Article provides the solution under the provision on the obligation of good faith. .. " § 2615 cmt. 5.
In situations in which neither sense nor justice is served by either answer when
the issue is posed in flat terms of "excuse" or "no excuse," adjustment under the
various provisions of this Article is necessary, especially the sections on good
faith ... and on the reading of all provisions in the light of their purposes, and

the general policy of this Act to use equitable principles in furtherance of commercial standards and good faith.
§ 2-615 cmt. 6. Of course, good faith in this context is defined under the Code in section 2103, as between merchants, as "honesty in fact and the observance of reasonable commercial
standards of fair dealing in the trade." § 2-103(1)(b).
328. Copesky v. Superior Court, 280 Cal. Rptr. 338, 348 (Ct. App. 1991).
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One effective protection that a borrower has from this type of harmful conduct by the lender is deterrence. The lender must be deterred from
engaging in this type of behavior either by a bonding mechanism or by an
independent duty imposed statutorily or judicially. The borrower cannot
easily restrain the lender in this regard on his own, and ultimately the
lender must either restrain himself or be restrained by the force of law.
As we have seen in Copesky, the prospect of simple contract damages is
not enough to effect such self-restraint by banks.330 Rather, the award of
such damages only encourages a more diligent calculation of the economic
efficiency of particular opportunistic conduct contemplated by lenders,
since they know that ordinary tort and even punitive damages may no
longer be available to the borrower. Loss of reputation is similarly an ineffective deterrent, since as one scholar has noted, "actions by the lender
will often prove ambiguous in their justification. It will frequently be difficult, in other words, 3 for
future borrowers to draw inferences from [the]
31
lender's past actions.
Finally, once the lender's misbehavior is revealed, even the prospect
of the injured borrower seeking alternative sources of credit may not be
an effective deterrent. This is true because the costs to the borrower of
negotiating a new loan arrangement with a substitute source of funds can
be quite high, both in terms of direct transaction costs and, more indirectly, the lost opportunity costs suffered by the borrower during the substitution process. In addition, to the extent that the lender's misbehavior
had a substantial negative economic impact on the borrower and/or its
competitive position in the market, the borrower may be a less attractive
loan applicant for other potential lenders. As a consequence, not only
does this result in a diminution of deterrence to lender misbehavior, but
the net result is actually an increase in the lender's incentives to engage
in or at least not to actively refrain from such misbehavior, because the
lender is aware of the borrower's limited remedial alternatives.3 32 Ironically, the very courts to which injured borrowers turn for protection from
lender abuse and over-reaching, not only frequently fail to afford them
329. Even the disgorgement of profits is problematic in this regard, because there is no
way to precisely determine what profits, if any, would have been earned in the hands of the
borrower if he, rather than the lender, had been managing the opportunity, or if he had
been free of that particular market competitor during the precise period in question.
330. Copesky, 280 Cal. Rptr. at 348.
331. Fischel, supra note 1, at 139.
332. See id. at 139. The author points out that in theory "the probability of opportunistic behavior by lenders is increased by the presence of the very monitoring and bonding
mechanisms designed to limit debtor misbehavior." Id. In addition the author highlights the
difficulty which may confront a borrower seeking substitute sources of funds
when the relationship between the initial lender and the borrower has become
highly specialized over time. If the lender has acquired a great deal of costly
information about the particular borrower and its prospects, it can loan on more
advantageous terms than lenders who are less informed. The advantage of the
first lender will be even greater if the borrower is faced with time immediacy.
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any protection, but, in the process, actually make the situation worse by
encouraging rather than discouraging lender misbehavior.
IV.

A.

SUGGESTIONS FOR REFORM

The Public Welfare

One of the primary bases for the decision in Commercial Cotton was
its favorable comparison between the insurance industry, where the new
tort of bad faith breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing was first created and the banking industry.33 In comparing the
two industries, the Commercial Cotton court found that they "have much
in common, both being highly regulated industries performing vital public
services substantially affecting the public welfare." '334 In overturning that
case, the Copesky court disagreed that the banking industry substantially
affected the public welfare, stating that it found nothing "in the status of
that it
banking as an industry" 335 sufficiently important or substantial
336
should even "have an effect upon the issue before us.
In reaching this rather striking conclusion, the Copesky court did not
engage in any analytical discussion concerning why the insurance industry substantially affected the public welfare in a way that the banking
industry did not. In fact, the court did not even identify any factors or
elements by which future courts could determine whether a particular industry met the standard of "substantially affecting the public interest."
Copesky simply said that the banking industry did not. 337 Ironically,
while Copesky criticized the Commercial Cotton decision for its lack of
citation or other authority to support its invention of the "quasi-fiduciary" standard, the only authority which Copesky cited in support of its
rejection of Commercial Cotton's view of the importance of the banking
industry to the public welfare was a student comment in a law review
that found the singling out of the banking industry in this regard to be
"absurd," and concluded that it was no more "affected with the public
interest" than the garbage collection industry. 38
Interestingly, Commercial Cotton did not afford the banking industry the status of "quasi-fiduciary" merely on the basis of it "affecting the
public interest." Rather, the court said that banking, like insurance, "substantially affect[ed] the public interest."3 3 Neither the student comment
nor Copesky dealt with what, if any, enlargement of meaning was meant
or occasioned by the qualification of substantiality. However, it strikes
this author as "absurd" to dismiss the importance of the banking indus333. Commercial Cotton Co. v. United California Bank, 209 Cal. Rptr. 551, 554 (Ct.
App. 1985).
334. Id.
335. Copesky, 280 Cal. Rptr. at 347.
336. Id.
337. Id.
338. Id. (citing Curtis, supra note 245, at 816-17).
339. Commercial Cotton, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 554 (emphasis added).
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try to the public welfare so casually and superficially. Surely, there is a
substantiality in this regard which banking does not share with garbage
collection!
Had the Copesky court delved into the subject more deeply, it might
have noted that although the list of industries that merely and generally
affect the public welfare might be endless, it could be said that there is a
clear hierarchy among them and that distinctions can and should be
made as a matter of public policy. As evidence of the importance of the
banking industry to the public welfare, Congress has placed the full faith
and credit of the United States government behind the public's deposits
(up to $100,000 per account) in the form of FDIC insurance. Moreover,
through federal truth in lending laws, Congress has again intervened into
the banking industry and required that a full and rather detailed set of
financial disclosures must be made in connection with every loan transaction. 340 These distinctive features of the banking industry distinguish it
from many others which affect the public welfare in terms of substantiality, and arguably place it somewhere at or near the top of the hierarchical
list. Notably, even the insurance industry, which Copesky acknowledges
to be at the top of that list,3 4 ' does not have anything like FDIC insurance and therefore the full faith and credit of the federal government
behind it.
Accordingly, this author suggests that Commercial Cotton was correct in finding that there is something distinctive or "special" about the
bank-borrower and the bank-depositor relationship that justifies, in the
interest of public welfare, affording the public protections that more
closely resemble the insurance industry than the garbage collection industry. The decision in Copesky which criticized and overruled Commercial
Cotton was simply wrong and short-sighted. It failed to accurately consider the vital public functions which the banking industry performs, its
distinctive importance to the public welfare, and the peculiar vulnerability of borrowers and depositors to abuse through opportunistic behavior
and misbehavior by their bankers.
Accordingly, it does not appear "absurd" to this author in the least
to suggest that there is indeed something very special about the banking
industry that warrants special treatment. This is not to suggest, in line
with the now discredited decision in Commercial Cotton, that the entire
industry should be characterized as having a fiduciary or even a quasifiduciary relationship with its customers. There is a middle ground that
goes substantially beyond where Copesky left us but not as far as Commercial Cotton would take us.

340. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-93 (1988).
341. Copesky, 280 Cal. Rptr. at 343.
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B. Bifurcation of Negotiation and Processing
The decision in Stone v. Davis342 suggests a reasonable alternative to
the polar extremes posed by Copesky or Commercial Cotton. In Stone,
the court drew a sharp distinction, with substantial analytical support,
between the negotiation process by which the terms and conditions of a
loan or deposit agreement are reached, and the servicing of that agreement by the bank.3 4 3 This is a sound and reasonable bifurcation that has

much to offer. A careful review of lender liability claims on the basis of
fiduciary duty reveals that in most of them the borrowers do not allege
that the lender owed them such a duty in the initial negotiation of their
loan agreements. Rather, almost all of their claims relate to conduct by
the lender in the course of what could accurately be characterized as either the servicing or .processing stages of the loan, and in terms of how
their written agreement should be interpreted, enforced and modified
during the course of such servicing.34
Therefore, a management regime that recognized this distinction between the negotiation and servicing or processing phases would not upset
the traditional view of the arm's-length relationship between a bank and
its customer, whether borrower or depositor. Rather, it would merely extend the already existing law by virtue of the federal government's imposition of disclosure requirements on banks, which now tempers that
relationship in rational and fair ways. This system could be improved and
clarified by positive state and federal legislation expressly providing that
in the servicing of loans and customer deposits, banks are in a normative
fiduciary relationship with their customers, which requires them to use
the utmost "candor, rectitude, care, loyalty and good faith-in fact to
treat the [customer] as well as the [bank] would treat itself."31" Any
breach of this duty should result, if not in tort damages per se, at the
very minimum, in a trebling of such damages or some similar remedy,
which serves not only as compensation, but also serves the goal of deterring banks from engaging in such behavior and punishing them when they
3 46

do.

It has been suggested that to impose such a fiduciary requirement
upon banks would be totally inappropriate, as banks and their borrowers
are adverse in the negotiating process. 347 Although this may be true while
342.

419 N.E.2d 1094 (Ohio), cert. denied 454 U.S. 1081 (1981).

343. Id. at 1098.
344. See, e.g., Blon v. Bank One, 519 N.E.2d 363 (Ohio 1988); Logsdon v. National
City Bank, 601 N.E.2d 262 (Ohio C.P. 1991).
345. Burdett v. Miller, 957 F.2d 1375, 1381 (7th Cir. 1992) (describing the duties of a
fiduciary in terms of principal and agent) (citation omitted).

346. Under the holding in Copesky, banks would be free to act "unreasonably, and
even in bad faith, den[y] liability on a contract or interpose spurious defenses." Copesky,
280 Cal. Rptr. at 348-49. A customer injured by such "lying" and unreasonable behavior
would be limited to simple contract damages. Consequently, not only would the customer
not be made whole, but banks facing such a limited range of damages would not be deterred
from acting in a manner harmful to the public interests at stake.
347. See Weinberger v. Kendrick, 698 F.2d 61, 79 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied 464 U.S.
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the parties are still at the bargaining table, there is little analytical reason
to continue this type of characterization once its predicate falls away.
Once the bargaining is over, the agreement has been struck and the parties are in the performance stage of their agreement, which consists of the
bank's servicing and processing of the agreement.
It strikes me as even more appropriate to suggest that an industry
which expressly invites its customers to trust it in ways that few others
do3 48 should then be entitled to disclaim any responsibility for being
"trustworthy" unless it is specifically bargained for and included in the
written contract with their customer. Such trustworthiness is an assumptive base of the bank-borrower and bank-depositor relationship, especially in the servicing or processing phase of that relationship. As such,
the rebuttable presumption against a bank having fiduciary duties should
be reversed. Rather than requiring evidence of a conscious assumption of
such duties by the bank, the burden should be on the bank to demonstrate that, to the extent permitted by public policy, its customer specifically, freely and knowingly contracted out of this otherwise assumptive
relationship. Absent such a demonstration, the bank should be deemed to
have a fiduciary relationship with its borrowers and depositors which is
limited to the servicing and processing phase of their relationship. As the
court in M.L. Stewart said in the oft cited and by now famous quote,
"banks present a constant invitation to intending borrowers [to trust] and
thus subject themselves to whatever implication or obligation is to be
'349
drawn from that fact.
CONCLUSION

In the final analysis, it can hardly be doubted, notwithstanding the
decision in Copesky, that the. banking industry "perform[s] vital public
services substantially affecting the public welfare" 350 in ways that few
other industries do. To the extent that individual banks suffer substantial
losses by virtue of federal deposit insurance, each and every taxpayer
bears the ultimate burden of those losses. The savings and loan crisis is a
classic example of society paying for banking mistakes. The public's trust
in that industry, its willingness to participate in banking activities, to
save and invest money, to make deposits, and to borrow money to start or
expand business enterprises, is vitally important to the public welfare and
ultimately, ,o the national interest.
Although not susceptible to precise empirical verification, it is logical
to conclude that one of the primary factors which has fueled the recent
explosion of borrower lawsuits on the basis of a breach of fiduciary duty
818 (1983).
348. Interestingly, many banks even have the word "Trust" in their names, e.g., First
Bank and Trust, X,Y,Z Savings and Trust Co., etc., thereby furthering in the public's mind
the perception that "trust" is an integral part of the services offered by such corporations.
349. M.L. Stewart & Co. v. Marcus, 207 N.Y.S. 685, 692 (Sup. Ct. 1924).
350. Commercial Cotton Co. v. United California Bank, 209 Cal. Rptr. 551, 554 (Ct.
App. 1985).
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is a loss and perceived abuse of that trust which banks so actively solicit
and borrowers so willingly give them. As a consequence, banks have suffered enormous costs in defending such litigation and in satisfying the
resulting judgments. No doubt these losses have been passed on to borrowers and depositors in the form of increased costs and a reduced willingness to lend. The public has likewise suffered losses on a similar scale,
brought about by a chilling effect on borrowing caused by a reduction in
the availability of funds and the increase in the costs associated with borrowing. Judicial interpretations which severely restrict the recognition of
a fiduciary relationship between a borrower or depositor and its lender or
bank, where all of the elements of trust and the abuse of that trust are
present, tend to undercut the ability or willingness of the public to trust
in the banking industry or participate in it. Such decisions can have significantly damaging and far-reaching effects in terms of the public's willingness to expose itself and its fortunes to such risks, and ought to be
approached with a caution commensurate with the stakes involved.
Similarly, such interpretations also tend to undercut the ability of
the parties to reduce their transaction costs by creating mutually beneficial monitoring and bonding mechanisms, thereby actually increasing the
costs of such transactions. Consequently, they should be undertaken only
under the most extreme circumstances and with a full appreciation of
their potentially damaging and counterproductive implications.
Perhaps more than any other industry, trust is the "coin of the
realm" in the banking industry. As noted in the court's decision in Commercial Cotton, "except for state or federal regulatory oversight,3"' both
depositors and borrowers (at least with respect to the servicing or
processing aspects) are "totally dependent on the banking institution to
which it entrusts. . . and depend on the bank's honesty and expertise to
protect them."3 2 Banks invite both borrowers and depositors to trust
them, and they receive that trust from both in a myriad of ways. It is an
inherent part of their relationship. As such, the lives, fortunes and futures
of countless thousands are placed in the hands of the nation's banks on a
daily basis. The ultimate price of that trust is quite simply to be "trustworthy." By virtue of its nature, history and development, the fiduciary
obligation is uniquely capable of ensuring such trustworthiness where it is
not otherwise voluntarily provided.
Bifurcating the lender-borrower (and bank-depositor) relationship
between the negotiation and the servicing stages, and recognizing a fiduciary obligation in the latter and an arm's-length relationship in the former, would constitute a modest but helpful beginning in insuring the
necessary trustworthiness of lenders and banks where it otherwise might
not exist. In addition, such recognition would balance the interests of
both the banking industry and the public while affecting only a minimal
disruption of violence to the traditional relationship between the parties.
351. Id.
352. Id.

HeinOnline -- 29 Wake Forest L. Rev. 779 1994

780

WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 29

Finally, such a system would recognize the reasonable and foreseeable
contemporary expectations and values of the modern depositor and borrower, thereby increasing both their trust in the banking industry and
their willingness to participate and expose themselves to its inherent
risks. As a consequence, the banking industry would receive the benefit of
increased soundness and participation from the public. In turn, the public
would receive the benefit of increased safety and freedom from the costly
abuse of their trust and coercive opportunism and misbehavior by their
bankers and lenders.
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